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Abstract
Movement data are sensitive, because people’s whereabouts may allow re-
identification of individuals in a de-identified database and thus can poten-
tially reveal intimate personal traits, such as religious or sexual preferences.
In this thesis, we focus on a distributed setting in which movement data
from individual vehicles are collected and aggregated by a centralized sta-
tion. We propose a novel approach to privacy-preserving analytical process-
ing within such a distributed setting, and tackle the problem of obtaining
aggregated traffic information while preventing privacy leakage from data
collection and aggregation. We study and analyze three different solutions
based on the differential privacy model and on sketching techniques for effi-
cient data compression. Each solution achieves different a trade-off between
privacy protection and utility of the transformed data. Using real-life data,
we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approaches in terms of data utility
preserved by the data transformation, thus bringing empirical evidence to
the fact that the “privacy-by-design” paradigm in big data analysis has the
potential of delivering high data protection combined with high quality even
in massively distributed techno-social systems.
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Riassunto
I dati di mobilita` sono da considerarsi dati sensibili, perche´ la conoscenza dei
luoghi visitati puo` permettere la re-identificazione degli individui anche in
un database privato degli identificatori, rivelando caratteristiche potenzial-
mente intime e personali, come la religione o le preferenze sessuali. In questa
tesi ci concentriamo su un ambiente distribuito in cui i movimenti di veicoli
sono raccolti e aggregati da una stazione centrale. Proponiamo infatti un
approccio per l’elaborazione di analisi che preservi la privacy in un ambiente
distribuito, affrontando cioe` il problema di ottenere informazione aggregata
sul traffico evitando al contempo perdite di privacy dovute alle fasi di rac-
colta e di elaborazione. Analizziamo tre soluzioni diverse, tutte basate sul
modello della differential privacy e su tecniche di sketching per la compres-
sione dei dati. Ogni soluzione permette di ottenere un diverso bilanciamento
tra protezione della privacy individuale e utilita` dei dati trasformati. Va-
lutiamo inoltre l’efficacia delle nostre soluzioni in termini di mantenimento
dell’utilita` usando dati della vita reale, fornendo una dimostrazione empi-
rica del fatto che il paradigma di “privacy-by-design” nell’analisi di big data
riesce sia a fornire un’elevata protezione che a mantenere una buona qualita`
dei dati, anche in sistemi sociali fortemente distribuiti.
5

Contents
Introduction 9
The Privacy-by-Design Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Contribution and Organization of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing and Mining 15
1.1 Anonymity by Randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Differential Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Anonymity by Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Anonymity in Mobility Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Secure Multi-Party Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 Sketching in Distributed Stream Systems 27
2.1 Distributed Stream System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Sketching of Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.1 AGMS Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.2 Count-Min Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.3 Count Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Reference Model 33
3.1 Movement Data Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Differential Privacy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Privacy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4 Privacy-Aware Distributed Mobility Data Analytics 41
4.1 Approach Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Privacy-Aware Node Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.1 Trajectory Generalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7
4.2.2 Frequency Vector Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.3 Privacy-preserving Vector Transformation . . . . . . . 44
4.2.3.1 Computation of Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.3.2 UniversalNoise Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.3.3 BoundedNoise Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.3.4 BalancedNoise Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.4 Vector Sketching for Compact Communications . . . . 51
4.3 Coordinator Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5 Evaluation on Real Big Data 55
5.1 Dataset Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2 Spatial Tessellation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3 Utility Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3.1 Network-based Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3.2 Mobility Application Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.4 Analytical evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.4.1 Impact of Sensitivity on Privacy Transformations . . . 61
5.4.2 Privacy and Utility of BoundedNoise Approach . . . . 64
5.4.3 Data Utility for UniversalNoise and BalancedNoise
Approches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4.4 Evaluation of Sketching Transformations . . . . . . . . 79
Conclusion 83
Bibliography 85
8
Introduction
Over the last few years, the technique of analysis and knowledge discovery,
that allow the extraction of valuable knowledge from databases, have become
increasingly central. These processes acquired great importance thanks to
the availability of a large and ever-growing quantity of data, that are usually
provided by users while using different kinds of services. These data are
more and more complex, and they are called big data, to summarize their
main intrinsic characteristics: the data are very large and have a very fine
level of detail, making it harder to perform analyses. In addition, data are
rarely available in a single or few centralized structures, but often they are
distributed among users, so it is necessary to find a way to gather them. On
the other hand, big data offer many new opportunities to understand our
society because they describe in detail the activities of the population.
Example of complex and big data are: the traces of the goods purchased
by people, stored by automatic payment systems; the query-logs, stored by
search engines; the information, held by social networks, about the personal
relationships as friendships, partnerships, etc...
Often in our society many decisions are taken based on the knowledge
represented in these datasets; therefore, sophisticated techniques for analysis
have been developed, to have the opportunity to gather, save and analyze
more and more complex data. These techniques are able to extract patterns,
models, profiles and general rules that describe the behavior of a community.
Indeed, through the analyses of personal data with sophisticated tools, we
have created new chances for understanding complex phenomena, such as
to comprehend the mobility in an urban area, and to foresee the diffusion
of an economic crisis or the spread of epidemics and viruses.
In this thesis we consider movement data describing the mobility be-
havior of a population in a territory. The widespread availability of low
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cost GPS devices enables the collection of these data at a large scale. Un-
derstanding of the human mobility behavior in a city could be extremely
useful to improve the use of city space and accessibility of various places
and utilities, to manage the traffic network, and to reduce traffic jams.
Generalization and aggregation of individual movement data can provide an
overall description of traffic flows in a given time interval and their variation
over time. Intuitively, movement data of multiple individual devices can
be collected and aggregated by a central station. However, this centralized
setting entails two important problems: a) the amount of information to be
collected and processed may exceed the capacity of the storage and com-
putational resources; and b) the raw data describe the mobility behavior of
the individuals in such great detail that they could enable the inference of
very sensitive information related to the private personal sphere.
Some recent works [63, 41, 12] have investigated how to aggregate dis-
tributed mobility data efficiently. For instance, Andrienko et al. [12] propose
a method for generalization and aggregation of movement data that requires
all individual moving trajectories be transformed into aggregate flows be-
tween areas. Though these works consider releasing statistic information
instead of raw trajectories to the central station, there still may exist pri-
vacy leakage. For instance, the analyses of low-density aggregate traffic flows
(e.g., in rural areas) may still reveal the identity of the vehicles involved in
these flows.
In order to solve these problems, in this thesis we propose a privacy-
preserving distributed analytical processing framework for the aggregation
of movement data. We assume that on-board location devices in vehicles
continuously trace the positions of the vehicles and periodically send statis-
tical information about their movements to a central station. The central
station, which we call coordinator, will store the received statistical informa-
tion and compute a summary of the traffic conditions of the whole territory,
based on the information collected from individual vehicles. Since the co-
ordinator can be untrusted, we design privacy-preserving methods for each
individual participant vehicle that provide formal privacy guarantee, mean-
ing that the statistic information revealed to the coordinator will not be
swayed too much by whether or not a specific individual participant. The
basic idea behind our approach is that even radical forms of data random-
ization, capable of yielding strong protection of personal mobility data for
10
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each participant vehicle, can be adopted in our setting while still allowing a
correct reconstruction of aggregated traffic information on the coordinator
side. The results presented in this thesis show how the application of the
privacy-by-design paradigm in this complex system, characterized by highly
distributed big data, allow us to maintain under control the utility of data,
with the aim to perform important collective mobility analyses, while pro-
viding an high level of protection for each individual by using the differential
privacy model.
The Privacy-by-Design Paradigm
One of the most hot topics in the data privacy field has been Privacy-by-
Design. This concept was coined in the ‘90s by Ann Cavoukian, the Infor-
mation and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada. In brief, privacy-by-
design refers to the philosophy and approach of embedding privacy into the
design, operation and management of information processing technologies
and systems. This innovative paradigm is also introduced by the European
Commission in the proposal of the reform, on January 25, 2012, of the data
protection rules.
Privacy-by-design promises a quality leap in the conflict between data
protection and data utility. The principle of “by design” was applied to the
data mining domain in [60], where Monreale showed that higher protection
and quality can be better achieved in a goal-oriented approach. In such
an approach, the data mining process is designed with assumptions about:
(a) the sensitive personal data that are the subject of the analysis; (b) the
attack model, i.e., the purpose of a malicious party that has an interest
in discovering the sensitive data of certain individuals; (c) the category of
analytical queries that are to be answered with the data.
These assumptions are fundamental for the design of a privacy-preserving
framework for various reasons.
First of all, the techniques for privacy preservation strongly depend on the
nature of the data that we want to protect. For example, many proposed
methods are suitable for continuous variables but not for categorical vari-
ables, while other techniques employed to anonymize sequential data such
as tabular data are not appropriate for moving object datasets.
Second, a valid framework for privacy protection has to define the back-
11
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ground knowledge of the adversary, that strongly depends on the context
and on the kind of data. Different assumptions on the background knowl-
edge of an attacker entail different defense strategies. Clearly, the assump-
tion that the background knowledge of an adversary depends on the context
allows to realize frameworks that guarantee reasonable levels of privacy ac-
cording to the privacy expectation.
Finally, a privacy-preserving strategy should find an acceptable trade-off be-
tween data privacy on one side and data utility on the other side. In order
to reach this goal it is fundamental to take into account during the design
of the framework the analytical questions that are to be answered with the
transformed data. This means designing a transformation process capable
to preserve some data properties that are necessary to preserve the results
obtained by specific analytical and/or mining tasks.
In this thesis, we propose the use of the privacy-by-design paradigm in
a novel setting, where it is necessary to take into account other important
aspects that such as the data distribution and the communications from
the nodes and the central station. In particular, in a distributed context,
a suitable privacy-preserving framework must try to reduce the amount of
information to be transmitted. Clearly, to this end we can use summa-
rization techniques, but we have to pay attention because these techniques
can introduce further approximation on the data that could lead to a more
degradation on the data utility. As a consequence, the distributed setting
adds a novel challenge in the application of the privacy-by-design paradigm;
here, a valid privacy-aware framework has to keep under control the trade-
off among three important aspects: privacy protection, data quality and
performance of the overall system.
Contribution and Organization of the Thesis
The main question addressed in this thesis is the following:
How to design a privacy-preserving framework for distributed mobility
data analytics
• while guaranteeing high level of individual privacy
• while reducing the amount of information to be transmitted, and
• without sacrificing the quality of data utility?
12
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Transforming the data in such a way as to protect sensitive information
is increasingly hard but our belief is that the research results reported in this
thesis brings evidence to the fact that the “privacy-by-design” paradigm in
big data analytics has the potential of delivering high data protection com-
bined with high quality even in massively distributed techno-social systems.
With a clear analytical goal to realize, e.g., the continuous monitoring of
traffic flows, it is possible to design a privacy-preserving process that, as
in our study, solves the problem delivering results with a bounded (small)
quality-loss within a framework where the risk of privacy leakage is also
bounded (and very small). The validity of our privacy-preserving frame-
work is shown both by theoretical results and by a deep experimentation on
real-life data.
We have the following contributions. First, to protect individual privacy,
we propose three data transformation methods based on the well-known dif-
ferential privacy model; each solution is characterized by a different trade-off
between privacy and data utility. Second, to further reduce the amount of
information that each vehicle communicates to the central station, we pro-
pose to apply sketching techniques to the differentially private data to obtain
a compressed representation. The central station is able to reconstruct the
movement data represented by the sketched data that, although transformed
for guaranteeing privacy, preserve some important properties of the original
data that make them useful for mobility analyses. We validate the robust-
ness and efficiency of our privacy-preserving data aggregation methods by
extensive experiments on large, real GPS data.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 discuss the most relevant research work re-
lated to the contribution of this thesis. Specifically, Chapter 1 presents an
overview of the work in literature on the individual privacy protection ad-
dressed by the data mining and the statistics community, while in Chapter 2
we describe the system architecture that we use in the work presented in this
thesis and the sketching algorithms that are used in our privacy-preserving
framework.
Chapter 3 introduces background information and definitions that are
very important for the deep understanding of the details of our framework
and states the problem addressed in this thesis.
Chapter 4 is the core of the thesis, in fact here we introduce a privacy-
13
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preserving framework for distributed mobility data analytics that guarantees
strong individual privacy protection, while preserving the quality of the
transformed data. This framework is based on the notion of differential
privacy that is a very strong privacy model.
In Chapter 5 we present and discuss experimental results obtained from
the application of our methods to real-world data.
Lastly, Chapter 5.4.4 concludes the thesis.
Part of the results of the studies described in this thesis are presented in
the following works:
Anna Monreale, Wendy Hui Wang, Francesca Pratesi, Salvatore Rinzi-
villo, Dino Pedreschi, Gennady L. Andrienko, and Natalia V. An-
drienko. Privacy-preserving Distributed Movement Data Aggregation.
Accepted for publication in AGILE, 2013.
Anna Monreale, Wendy Hui Wang, Francesca Pratesi, Salvatore Rinzi-
villo, Dino Pedreschi, Gennady L. Andrienko, and Natalia V. An-
drienko. Differential Privacy in Distributed Mobility Analytics. Sub-
mitted in PVLDB, 2013.
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Chapter 1
Privacy-Preserving Data
Publishing and Mining
In the last years, the importance of the privacy protection is rising thanks
to the availability of large amounts of data. These data collections can be
gathered from various channels. Typically, the data collector or data holder
releases these data to data miners and analysts who can conduct on them
statistical and data mining analyses. The published data collections could
contain personal information about users and their individual privacy could
be compromised during the analytical process.
In recent years, individual privacy has been one of the most discussed
jurisdictional issues in many countries. Citizens are increasingly concerned
about what companies and institutions do with their data, and ask for clear
positions and policies from both the governments and the data owners. De-
spite this increasing need, there is not a unified view on privacy laws across
countries. The European Union regulates privacy by Directive 95/46/EC
(Oct. 24, 1995) and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (December 18, 2000).
The European regulations, as well as other regulations such as the U.S. rules
on protected health information (from HIPAA), are based on the notion of
“non-identifiability”. The regulation on privacy in the EU was recently re-
vised by the comprehensive reform of the data protection rules proposed on
Jan. 25, 2012 by the European Commission, that is still under discussion.
The problem of protecting the individual privacy when disclosing informa-
tion is not trivial and this makes the problem scientifically attractive. It
has been studied extensively in two different communities: in data mining,
15
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under the general umbrella of privacy-preserving data mining, and in statis-
tics, under the general umbrella of statistical disclosure control.
In this chapter we provide an overview of the most important results
achieved so far in the field of data privacy; we also present a very recent
model, called differential privacy, that will be one of the most important
notions in our work.
1.1 Anonymity by Randomization
Randomization methods are used to modify data to preserve the privacy
of sensitive information. These techniques try to “hide” information by
randomly perturbing the data [49].
The algorithms belonging to this group of techniques first of all modify the
data by using randomization techniques. Then, from the perturbed data
it is still possible to extract patterns and models. There are two kinds of
randomization: additive and multiplicative.
By using the additive random perturbation, the distorted dataset is ob-
tained drawing independently, from a probability distribution, a noise quan-
tity and adding it to each record of the original dataset.
The original record values cannot be easily guessed from the distorted data
as the variance of the noise distribution is assumed large enough. On the
contrary, the distribution of the original data can be easily recovered, sub-
tracting the noise distribution from the distribution of the perturbed dataset.
A typical assumption is that both distributions are known: the first one is
public and the second one is easily obtainable by analyzing the perturbed
data [3]. It is important to note that it is possible to reconstruct only the
distribution and not the values of individual records [7].
For privacy-preserving data mining, multiplicative random perturbation
techniques can be also used.
There are three macro-categories of multiplicative random perturbation [22]:
- rotation perturbation. It refers to the techniques based on the notion
of matrix rotation. This category does not include only traditional
rotations, but also all orthonormal perturbations. The property of
this kind of perturbation is its capability to keep the dimensionality of
16
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dataset unchanged, while preserving both the distance between records
and the geometric shapes of data.
- projection perturbation. It refers to the technique of projecting a set of
data points from a high-dimensional space to a randomly chosen lower-
dimensional subspace, but it does not strictly guarantee the preser-
vation of distance/inner product, which may downgrade the model
accuracy.
- sketch-based approach. It aims at perturbing high-dimensional data
(and reducing them). It is very suitable to approximate inner queries
and dot-product estimation (see Section 2.2 for further details)
The main advantage of the randomization method is that it can be im-
plemented at data-collection time [4], because it is very simple and does not
require knowledge of the distribution of other records in the data for the
data transformation. This means that the data transformation process does
not need a trusted server containing all the original records.
The problem of the randomization (with the exception of sketches, which
can provide a uniform measure across different record [22]) is that it does
not consider the local density of the records and thus all records are han-
dled equally. Outlier records can be compared to records in denser regions
in the data and this can make an attack easier. Another weakness of a
randomization framework is that it does not provide guarantees in case of
re-identification attack conducted using public information. Indeed, if an
attacker has no background knowledge over the data, then the privacy can
be difficult to compromise; nevertheless, in [6], authors showed that the
randomization approach is unable to effectively guarantee privacy in high-
dimensional cases. Moreover, they provide an analysis revealing that the
use of public information makes this method vulnerable.
In [49] Kargupta et al. challenged the effectiveness of randomization
methods, showing that the original data matrix can be obtained from the
randomized data matrix using a random matrix-based spectral filtering tech-
nique.
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1.2 Differential Privacy
A recent model of randomization, though based on different assumptions, is
Differential Privacy. This is a privacy notion introduced in [35] by Dwork.
The key idea is that the privacy risks should not increase for a respondent
as a result of occurring in a statistical database; differential privacy ensure,
in fact, that the ability of an adversary to inflict harm should be essentially
the same, independently of whether any individual opts in to, or opts out
of, the dataset.
This privacy model is called -differential privacy, due to the level of
privacy guaranteed . It assures a record owner that any privacy breach will
not be a result of participating in the database since anything, or almost
nothing, that is learnable from the database with his record is also learn-
able from the one without his data. Moreover, in [35] is formally proved
that -differential privacy can provide a guarantee against adversaries with
arbitrary background knowledge. This strong guarantee is achieved by com-
parison with and without the record owner’s data in the published data.
It is important to note that the parameter  is public [34].
The choice of  is essentially a social question, even if some works (like
[54]) tried to suggest how to instantiate it in a practical example.
There are two popular mechanisms to achieve differential privacy: Laplace
mechanism that supports queries whose outputs are numerical [36] and ex-
ponential mechanism that works for any queries whose output spaces are
discrete [57]. The basic idea of the Laplace mechanism is to add noise to
aggregate queries (e.g., counts) or queries that can be reduced to simple
aggregates. The Laplace mechanism has been widely adopted in many ex-
isting works for various data applications. For instance, [82, 26] present
methods for minimizing the worst-case error of count queries; [14, 32] con-
sider the publication of data cubes; [45, 84] focus on publishing histograms;
and [58, 52] propose the methods of releasing data in a differential private
way for data mining. On the other hand, for the analysis whose outputs are
not real or make no sense after adding noise, the exponential mechanism
selects an output from the output domain, r ∈ R, by taking into considera-
tion its score of a given utility function q in a differentially private manner.
It has been applied for the publication of audition results [57], coresets [37],
18
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frequent patterns [18] and decision trees [39]. Recently much attention is
paid to distributed private data analysis. In this setting, n parties (each
holding some sensitive data) wish to compute some aggregate statistics over
all parties’ data with or without a centralized coordinator. [15, 19] prove
that when computing the sum of all parties’ inputs without a central coor-
dinator, any differentially-private multi-party protocol with a small number
of rounds and small number of messages must have large error. To the best
of our knowledge, Rastogi et al. [69] and Chan et al. [79] were the first ones
to consider the problem of privately aggregating sums over multiple time
periods. Both of them consider the untrusted coordinator, malicious coor-
dinator in particular, and use both encryption and differential privacy for
the design of privacy-preserving data aggregation methods. Compared with
their work, we focus on semi-honest coordinator, with the aim of designing
privacy-preserving techniques by adding meaningful noises to improve data
utility, which is an issue that is rarely discussed in both [69, 79]. We agree
that our methods can be further enforced against the malicious coordinator
by applying the encryption methods in [69, 79].
There are some works on publishing differentially private spatial data.
Chen et al. [24] propose to release a prefix tree of trajectories with injected
Laplace noise. Each node in the prefix tree contains a doublet in the form
of < tr(v), c(v) >,where tr(v) is the set of trajectories of the prefix v, and
c(v) is a version of |tr(v)| with Laplace noise. Compared with our system,
the prefix tree in [24] is data-dependent, i.e., it should have a different struc-
ture when the underlying database changes. In our work, the frequency
vector is data-independent. Cormode et al. present a solution to publish
differentially private spatial index (e.g., quadtrees and kd-trees) to provide
a private description of the data distribution [26]. Its main utility concern
is the accuracy of multi-dimensional range queries (e.g., how many individ-
uals fall within a given region). Therefore, the spatial index only stores the
count of a specific spatial decomposition. It does not store the movement
information (e.g., how many individuals move from location i to location j)
as in our work. In another paper, Cormode et al. [27] propose to publish a
contingency table of trajectory data. The contingency table can be indexed
by specific locations so that each cell in the table contains the number of
people who commute from the given source to the given destination. The
contingency table is very similar to our frequency vector structure. How-
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ever, [27] has a different focus from ours: we investigate how to publish
the frequency vector in a differential privacy way, while [27] addresses the
sparsity issue of the contingency table and presents a method of releasing a
compact summary of the contingency table with Laplace noise.
1.3 Anonymity by Indistinguishability
When the requirement of performing the data transformation at collection-
time is not necessary, a good choice is to apply methods that reduce the
probability of record identification by public information. In literature three
techniques have been proposed: k-anonymity, l-diversity and t-closeness.
k-anonymity. One approach to preserve privacy in data publishing is the
suppression of some of the data values, while releasing the remaining data
values exactly. However, suppressing only the identifying attributes is not
enough to protect privacy because other kinds of attributes, that are avail-
able in public database, such as age, zip-code and sex can be used in order
to accurately identify the records. This kind of attributes are known as
quasi-identifiers [80]. For example, in [81] it has been observed that for 87%
of the population in the United States, the combination of Zip Code, Gender
and Date of Birth corresponded to a unique person.
Therefore, it is evident that it is possible to use information derived from
different sources (e.g., by database cross-reference) to obtain additional
knowledge. We can define the linking attack as an attack in which an in-
truder (attacker) gains access to a database of personal data, in order to
make inferences on the basis of background knowledge which enables the
re-identification of the user(s).
The goal of k-anonymity is to guarantee that every individual object is hid-
den in a crowd of size k. A dataset satisfies the property of k-anonymity
if each released record has at least (k-1) other records also visible in the
release whose values are indistinct over the quasi-identifiers.
In k-anonymity techniques, methods such as generalization and suppression
are usually employed to reduce the granularity of representation of quasi-
identifiers. The first one generalizes the attribute values to a range in order
to reduce the granularity of representation (e.g., a city could be generalized
to its region). The method of suppression, instead, removes the value of an
20
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attribute.
l-diversity. Unfortunately, the k-anonymity framework can, in some case,
be vulnerable. Suppose that we have a k-anonymous dataset containing
a group of k entries with the same value for the sensitive attributes. In
this case, although the data are k-anonymous, the value of the sensitive
attributes can be easily inferred (homogeneity attack). Another problem
happens when an attacker knows information useful to associate some quasi-
identifiers with some sensitive attributes. In this case the attacker can re-
duce the number of possible values of the sensitive attributes (background
knowledge attack).
In order to eliminate these weaknesses of the k-anonymity, the technique
of l-diversity was proposed [55]. The aim of l-diversity is to maintain the
diversity of sensitive attributes. In particular, the main idea of this method
is that every group of individuals that can be isolated by an attacker should
contain at least l well-represented values for a sensitive attribute.
t-closeness l-diversity is insufficient to prevent attacks when the overall
distribution is skewed. The attacker can know the global distribution of the
attributes and use it to infer the value of sensitive attributes. In this case,
the t-closeness [53] method can be used. This technique requires that the
distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is close to the
distribution of the attribute in the overall table. The distance between the
two distributions should be no more than a threshold t.
1.4 Anonymity in Mobility Data
In Section 1.3 we have already said that, even in simple cases, suppressing
the identifier of individuals is not enough for privacy-preserving purposes.
One of the most effective methods that are studied in literature to ensure
privacy is k-anonymity; unfortunately, the traditional k-anonymity approach
focuses on relational tables.
A big problem of spatio-temporal data is that there is no longer a clear
distinction between qi (quasi-identifiers) and sa (sensitive attributes): a
hospital could be a qi for some users (e.g., for doctors and nurses this is the
workplace), while for all other users it is probably a sa. Therefore, protect-
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ing private information in this context is a significant challenge.
Many existing works about anonymity of moving objects have been
mainly developed in the context of Location Based Services (LBS). LBS
refer to those information services that deliver differentiated information
based on the user’s location at the time of the request. Thus, the user loca-
tion information necessarily appears in a request sent to the service provider
[56]. Clearly, also in this context, the k-anonymity is applicable: each user
avoids providing his exact location sending to the service provider a gener-
alized area that includes his location and the location of other k − 1 users.
Although the idea is the same as in the tabular case, generally traditional
techniques used for tabular datasets cannot be directly applied to this kind
of data, so k-anonymity must be adjusted appropriately.
As written in Riboni et al. [71], a possible technique to enforce anonymity
in LBS is to generalize precise location data in a request to an area includ-
ing a set (called anonymity set [68]) of other potential issuers. However,
they observe that, since we cannot define quasi-identifiers exactly, a large
amount of context data must be generalized in order to enforce anonymity.
As a consequence, the granularity of generalized context data released to the
service provider could be too coarse to provide the service at an acceptable
quality level.
Riboni et al. proposed a combined approach to address the issue of privacy
in context awareness [70]. In particular, they use obfuscation of sensitive
information and anonymity, generalizing precise location data in a request
to an area including an anonymity set of other potential issuers. The key
idea is that if even users who did not issue any request are potential issuers
with respect to the attacker’s external knowledge, then they belong to the
anonymity set.
In [17], Bettini et al. introduce the concept of historical k-anonymity,
that is based on the spatio-temporal pattern definition (for example, the trip
from the home to the workplace), and on the spatio-temporal generalization.
Indeed, an attacker may guess that two requests have been issued by the
same user, simply relying on proximity of locations or on the fact that
requests from the same issuer may be correlated. Given the set of requests
issued by a certain user, it satisfies historical k-anonymity if there exist
k − 1 history of locations belonging to k − 1 different users such that they
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are location-time consistent, i.e., undistinguishable.
Another example of k-anonymity in spatial data can be found in Mascetti
et al. [56]. Here, if the attacker does not know the generalization function,
the generalized location is computed as the Minimum Bounding Rectangle
(MBR) of the locations of the users in this set at the time when the request
has been issued. Otherwise, the algorithm imposes the partitioning function
to be independent from the issuers location, iteratively restricting the areas
(then, the anonymity sets) until any of the blocks contains less than k users.
A good point is that, if the degree of anonymity desired by each user at the
time of a request is not known by the attacker, algorithms remain safe even
when different values of k are admitted.
The main weakness of such solutions (not only of these three works, but
also in general) is that the scenario assumes the existence of a Location-aware
Trusted Server (LTS); the LTS receives the LBS requests from the users,
it performs the appropriate generalization (also hiding explicitly identifying
values), and it forwards the generalized request to the target service provider.
A LTS is actually an anonymizer, and the use of anonymizers may not always
be practical. Even if it were trusted, as stated in [48], an anonymizer may
itself present security, performance, and privacy problems. For example, the
anonymizer represents a single-point-of-attack for hackers; furthermore, the
anonymizer may become a bottleneck because of the large number of users
to be served.
A survey of location privacy techniques that work in traditional client-
server architectures without any trusted components other than the client’s
mobile device can be found in the work of Jensen et al. [48]. For instance,
in [85] we can find iPDA, an example of query enlargement technique, i.e.
a technique where each client enlarges its exact position into a region be-
fore sending it to the server. iPDA uses a cloacking technique implemented
on the client side, and it is suitable for issuing repeated queries, as in case
of mobility data, because it enlarges the region at each request. In [50]
users generate several false position data (dummies) to be sent to service
providers along with the real position data. So, the service provider cannot
distinguish the true position data from the set of all the received position
data. The service provider creates service answers that respond to all the
received position data and sends them to the user, who selects the true re-
sponse. Lastly, in [40] we can find a kind of cryptographic transformation,
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which uses both a Voronoi and a grid partition. The user finds the cell that
contains him, and utilizes Private Information Retrieval to request all points
within the region; the server does not know which region was retrieved, as
if it received a number of requests equal to the total number of cells.
Although the LBS context is very relevant to the problem of anonymity
in spatio-temporal data, there is another kind of problem to be considered:
anonymity in a static Moving Objects Databases (MOD). The main differ-
ence is the fact that LBS consider data points (requests) as continuously
arriving, and thus they provide on-line anonymity; instead, in MOD con-
text the information about the whole history of trajectories is available,
thus we can use more effective (and off-line) methods. Another difference is
in the goal of these two contexts: in LBS we must provide the service, so
learning the user’s exact position is not a requisite, and the data can also
be forgotten once that the service was provided (we can say that LBS is
service-centric); whereas in MOD we must preserve not only the anonymity
of the individuals, but also the quality of the data (for this reason we say
that MOD is data-centric) [1].
We provide a quick overview on works which tackle the problem of k-
anonymity of moving objects by the perspective of privacy aware publishing.
In [61], Monreale et al. focus on the choice of granularity of the spatial
generalization and especially on the research for a method of division of
the territory into sub-areas, that depends directly on the input trajectory
dataset. The privacy-by-design concept (see Introduction) is widely used in
this work.
In [59], Monreale et al. introduce a new privacy notion, called c-safety,
which provides an upper bound c to the probability of inferring that a given
person, observed in a sequence of non-sensitive places, has also stopped in
any sensitive location. They also implement an algorithm, called CAST,
which finds the best trajectory grouping in the dataset, constructing a c-
safe version of the input dataset.
In [64], Nergiz et al. use a grouping based approach in order to obtain
cluster trajectories, but they publish a reconstructed MOD, instead of a
generalized one. Indeed, they claim that the use of MBR discloses uncon-
trolled information about the exact location of the points, so they apply a
reconstruction approach (previously studied in the string alignment prob-
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lem), which releases atomic trajectories sampled randomly from the area
covered by anonymized trajectories.
In [86], Yarovoy et al. deeply analyze the problem of quasi-identifiers in mo-
bility data: they show that the anonymization groups may not be disjoint,
thus there may exist objects that can be identified explicitly by combining
different anonymization groups. They suggest that qi may be provided di-
rectly by personal settings or found by means of statistical data analysis.
In [2], Abul et al. propose the notion of (k, δ)-anonymity for moving ob-
ject databases, where δ represents the possible location imprecision. This is
an innovative concept of k-anonymity based on co-localization, which takes
advantage of the inherent uncertainty of the whereabouts of the moving ob-
jects. The authors also proposed an approach, called Never Walk Alone,
based on trajectory clustering and spatial translation, and they present its
improvement, Wait for Me, in [1]. This method is very similar to the previ-
ous one, but it is based on EDR distance [23] (instead of Euclidean distance),
which is time-tolerant, so Wait for Me can recognize similar trajectories even
if they are (slightly) shifted in time.
Finally, in [33], Domingo Ferrer and Trujillo-Rasua show a solution based
on perturbation and micro-aggregation: this method k-anonymizes each lo-
cation independently, using the whole set of trajectories. Particularly, the
algorithm creates clusters of locations (close in time and in space) in such a
way that the locations in each group belong to k different trajectories. The
result of this transformation is that the probability that a location of a true
trajectory appears in its anonymized version is at most 1k , while guarantee-
ing that the anonymized trajectories are suitable for range query for every
value of k.
1.5 Secure Multi-Party Computation
A Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) problem [87, 44] deals with com-
puting a certain function on multiple inputs, in a distributed network. The
problem in this case is to compute any probabilistic function on inputs that
are distributed among the participants in the network while ensuring inde-
pendence of the inputs, correctness of the computation, and that no more
information is revealed to participants in the computation, which can be
computed from a single participant or a coalition of participants.
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As noted in [44], a trivial centralized solution would be to assume a trusted
center exists, and that all users send their inputs to this trusted center for
the computation of their respective outputs. A preferable option is a dis-
tributed solution where trust is distributed.
SMC is often used in distributed environment, but regrettably it allows only
some kinds of computations.
One of the first techniques is shown in [21], where participants can share
secrets, even if one third of the participants deviate from the protocol (that
is based on not leaking secret information and on sending the correct mes-
sages).
A more recent solution can be found in [42], where Gilburd et al. propose a
new privacy model, k-privacy, for real-world large-scale distributed systems.
They use a relaxed privacy model implementing efficient cryptographically
secure primitives that do not require all-to-all communications.
Another example is the work of Sanil et al. [78], where they implement a
privacy-preserving algorithm of computing regression coefficients, that per-
mits (honest or semi-honest) agencies to obtain the global regression equa-
tion as well as to perform rudimentary goodness-of-fit diagnostics without
revealing their data.
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Sketching in Distributed
Stream Systems
In this chapter we provide a description of the system architecture that we
will use in our work, and we introduce the sketches, that are (quite recently
developed) data structures for summarizing large data streams.
2.1 Distributed Stream System Architecture
We consider a system architecture as the one described in [30]. In particular,
we assume a distributed-computing environment comprising a collection of
k (trusted) remote sites (nodes) and a designated (unnecessarily trusted)
coordinator site. A representation of our system is shown in Figure 2.1.
Streams of data updates arrive continuously at remote sites, while the
coordinator site is responsible for generating answers to periodic user queries
posed over the unions of remotely-observed streams across all sites. Each
remote site exchanges messages only with the coordinator, providing it with
state information on its (locally observed) streams. There is no communi-
cation between remote sites.
In this general distributed streaming model, each update at remote site j
is a triple of the form <i,v,±1>, denoting an insertion (+1) or deletion (-1)
of element v ∈ [Ui] in the fi,j frequency distribution. All frequency distribu-
tion vectors fi,j change dynamically over time; handling delete operations
allows us to effectively handle tracking over sliding windows of the streams,
by issuing implicit delete operations for expired stream items no longer in
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Figure 2.1: System representation
the window of interest at remote site).
It is important to observe that each of the dimensions of this problem
(continuous and distributed) induce specific technical bottlenecks. Fortu-
nately, for the first problem, when tracking statistical properties of large-
scale systems, answers that are precise to the last decimal are typically not
needed; instead, approximate query answers (with reasonable guarantees on
the error) are often sufficient, since we are typically looking for indicators
or patterns, rather than precisely-defined events. Concerning the challenge
of being in a distributed environment, we must try to reduce as much as
possible the amount of communications.
2.2 Sketching of Streams
When data sets reach considerable size, it may be necessary to transform
data into a more compact form. If we are satisfied with an approximated
answer for a problem, synopses of a massive data set [25] (like samples, his-
tograms, walvelets and sketches) are solutions to be considered: they capture
vital proprieties of the original data while occupying much less space. In
particular, sketches are relatively recent tools (most of the algorithms have
been presented in the years 2000s [25]), but they allow to receive an accu-
rate estimate of the answer. Moreover, they are particularly appropriate for
streaming data.
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Sketches are essentially a kind of linear transformation of the input.
There are two kind of sketches: frequency based sketches, concerned with
summarizing the frequency distribution of a data set, and sketches for dis-
tinct value queries, that count the number of distinct values in a given set.
We focus on the first category, because frequency based sketch are suitable
for a very large number of queries, like finding the most frequent items,
estimating the size of joins between relations, approximating range queries,
and, above all, extracting precise estimates of individual frequencies of items.
All the considered sketches have parametric size, depending on the val-
ues that are chosen by the user. Typically, α indicates the accuracy (i.e.
the approximation error), and γ represents the probability of exceeding the
accuracy bounds.
Note that, in order to decrease the error of the estimator, the size of the
sketch vector has to be increased.
As already mentioned in Section 1.1, the main strenght of this technique is
its use of the parameters α and γ: each user can specify a different accuracy
(security) level, and therefore he use a different sketch size.
Let U be the domain, and consequently |U| the domain size. We can
think about data input as a vector of size M = |U|. In the following, we use
this notation and we denote by f [i] the frequency of i-th item, and f˜ [i] the
approximated frequency of that item. Furthermore, we use C for the sketch
vector.
2.2.1 AGMS Sketch
The AGMS sketch was first presented, in a very primitive appearance, in
the work of Alon et al. [10], with the aim to estimate the sum of the squares
of the frequencies. With AGMS sketches, a data structure is mapped on a
(hopefully much) smaller vector.
The sketch consists of an array C of r counters. We need a hash function
gi, which maps U uniformly onto {−1,+1}. This function must be four-wise
independent, i.e. it must appear independent when considering sets of four
items together; as written in [25], a family of four-wise independent hash
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functions is given by h(x) = ax3 + bx2 +cx+dmod p for a, b, c and d chosen
uniformly from [p] with p prime (for more details see [76, 74]). The sketch
is built as follows.
∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ |C|, C[j] =
M∑
i=1
f [i] ∗ gj [i]
AGMS sketch was designed to estimate (self-)join, so there are not many
works that use this kind of sketches to estimate the single items. To the
best of our knowledge, [5] is one of them. Aggarwal and Yu explain how to
estimate any individual value.
Let Eki = C[j]∗gi[j]. We compute |C| values of Ek (one for each component
of the sketch) and then we compute the mean of these Ek (because the
expected contribution to the error is zero [25]).
Therefore:
f˜ [i] = E[Ek]
Setting r = O( 1
α2
log 1γ ) ensures that the estimation of f [i] has error at
most α · n with probability at least 1− γ.
A great strength of the AGMS sketch is that it allows cancellations, i.e.
negative frequencies. Some drawbacks are the strong independent guaran-
tees for the hash function, and the fact that each update affects all entries,
so its complexity is O(N), where N is the sketch size. An improvement of
this sketch is Fast-AGMS proposed by Cormode and Garofalakis [30]; Fast-
AGMS requires time sublinear at the cost of introducing a second (pair-wise
independent) hash function set.
2.2.2 Count-Min Sketch
Count-Min has been introduced for the first time by Cormode and Muthukr-
ishnan in [31].
Subsequently, it was thoroughly studied [28, 29, 25] because of its simplicity.
The sketch consists of an array C of d × w counters and for each of the d
rows a pair-wise independent hash function hj , that maps items onto [w].
Each item is mapped onto d entries in the array, by adding to the previous
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value with the new item. So each position of the sketch vector is:
C[j, k] =
∑
1≤i≤M :hj(i)=k
f [i]
Given a sketch representation of a vector we can estimate the original value
of each component of the vector by the following function:
f˜ [i] = min
1≤j≤d
C[j, hj(i)]
Multiple keys may hash to the same bucket and thus the count of a bucket
may overestimate (if frequencies are always positive) the true size of a key.
For this reason the estimation procedure returns the minimum value of the
counters a key is hashed to.
The estimation of each component j is affected by an error, but it is
shown that the overestimate is less than n/w, where n is the number of
components. So, setting d = log 1γ and w = O(
1
α) ensures that the estimation
of f [i] has error of at most α · n with probability at least 1− γ.
The advantages of Count-Min sketch are that it requires only pairwise in-
dependent hash functions and that its update time is significantly sublinear.
The main disadvantage is that it requires only positive values.
2.2.3 Count Sketch
The Count sketch [20, 25, 29] has the same structure of the Count-Min
sketch, but it requires an additional pair-wise independent hash function
family. One of these is required for the choice of the bucket (exactly as in
the Count-Min sketch), while the other one is required to encode the value
of item, like in the AGMS sketch. The sketch is defined by:
C[j, k] =
∑
1≤i≤M :hj(i)=k
gj [i] ∗ f [i]
The estimate of i-th item is:
f˜ [i] = median
1≤j≤d
C[j, hj(i)] ∗ gj [i]
The median is chosen, instead of the mean, since it is less sensitive to
extreme values [20]. A good comparison between some kinds of sketch and
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between estimators (mean, median or minimum) can be found in the works
of Rusu and Dobra [73, 75].
The dimensions of sketch are d = O(log 1γ ) and w = O(
1
α2
). The error of
estimation of f [i] is at most α · √F2, where F2 is the sum of the squares of
the frequencies
∑M
i=1 f [i]
2, with probability at least 1− γ.
The advantages of Count sketch are its update time and the ability to
handle negative values. The main disadvantage is that it requires two sets
of hash functions.
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Reference Model
In this chapter we define the basic concepts useful for describing the problem
and our proposed solutions. We introduce the key concept of mobility data,
how we represent them and how they are used in our framework. Then, we
provide the formal definitions of Differential Privacy; finally, we describe our
privacy model.
3.1 Movement Data Representation
The starting point of our work is to define the concept of trajectory:
Definition 3.1.1 (Trajectory). A Trajectory or spatio-temporal sequence is
a sequence of triplets T =< l1, t1 >, . . . , < ln, tn >, where ti (i = 1 . . . n)
denotes a timestamp such that ∀1≤i<n ti < ti+1 and li = 〈xi, yi〉 are points
in R2.
Intuitively, each pair 〈li, ti〉 indicates that the object is in the position
li = 〈xi, yi〉 at time ti.
In a time interval τ , each moving object can have multiple trajectories. We
do not require that each trajectory is complete, i.e., locations may be missing
at some timestamps. We allow the re-occurrence of some sub-trajectories
(i.e., the object may move between locations li and lj back and forth for
multiple times). For example, a vehicle can have two trajectories: T1 =
{< 〈a, b〉, t1 >,< 〈b, c〉, t2 >,< 〈c, a〉, t3 >} and T2 = {< 〈a, b〉, t4 >,<
〈c, d〉, t5 >}.
We assume that the territory is subdivided in cells C = {c1, c2, . . . , cp}
which compose a partition of the territory. For this partition we can use an
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existing division of the territory (e.g., census sectors, road segments, etc.)
or we can determine a data-driven partition as discussed in Section 5.2.
During a travel a user goes from a cell to another cell. We use g to denote
the function that applies the spatial generalization to a trajectory. Given
a trajectory T this function generates the generalized trajectory g(T ), i.e.
a sequence of moves with temporal annotations, where a move is a pair
(lci , lcj ), which indicates that the moving object moves from the cell ci to
the adjacent cell cj . Note that lci denotes the pair of spatial coordinates
representing the the centroid of the cell ci; in other words lci = 〈xci , yci〉.
The temporal annotated move is the quadruple (lci , lcj , tci , tcj ) where lci is
the location of the origin, lcj is the location of the destination and the tci , tcj
are the time information associate to lci and lcj . As a consequence, we define
a generalized trajectory as follows.
Definition 3.1.2 (Generalized Trajectory). Let T = 〈l1, t1〉, . . . , 〈ln, tn〉 be
a trajectory. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cp} be the set of the cells that compose
the territory partition. A generalized version of T is a sequence of temporal
annotated moves
Tg = {< lc1 , lc2 , tc1 , tc2 >< lc2 , lc3 , tc2 , tc3 > . . . < lcm−1 , lcm , tcm−1 , tcm >}
where m <= n.
More details on the generalization of trajectories are given in Section
4.2.1.
Now, we show how a generalized trajectory can be represented by a fre-
quency distribution vector. First, we define the function Move Frequency
(MF ) that, given a generalized trajectory Tg, a move (lci , lcj ) and a time
interval τ , computes how many times the move appears in Tg by consider-
ing the temporal constraint. More formally, we define the Move Frequency
function as follows.
Definition 3.1.3 (Move Frequency). Let Tg be a generalized trajectory and
let (lci , lcj ) be a move. Let τ be a temporal interval. The Move Frequency
function is defined as:
MF (Tg, (lci , lcj ), τ) = |{(lci , lcj , ti, tj) ∈ Tg|ti ∈ τ ∧ tj ∈ τ}|.
For any move (lci , lcj ), MF (Tg, (lci , lcj ), τ) can be any non-negative in-
teger. For instance, given a trajectory T = {< (a, b), t1 >,< (c, d), t2 >,
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< (a, b), t3 >,< (e, f), t4 >} and assuming (c, d) and (e, f) locations are both
positioned in the cell c2, the generalized trajectory is Tg = {< lc1 , lc2 , t1, t2 >,
< lc2 , lc1 , t2, t3 >,< lc1 , lc2 , t3, t4 >} and, e.g., MF (Tg, (lc1 , lc2), [t1, t4]) = 2.
This function can be easily extended to take into consideration a set of
generalized trajectories T G . In this case, the information computed by the
function represents the total number of movements from the cell ci to the
cell cj in a time interval in the set of trajectories.
Definition 3.1.4 (Global Move Frequency). Let T G be a set of generalized
trajectories and let (ci, cj) be a move. Let τ be a time interval. The Global
Move Frequency function is defined as:
GMF (T G , (ci, cj), τ) =
∑
∀Tg∈T G
MF (Tg, (ci, cj), τ).
The number of movements between two cells computed by either the
function MF or GMF describes the amount of traffic flow between the two
cells in a specific time interval. This information can be represented by a
frequency distribution vector.
Definition 3.1.5 (Vector of Moves). Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cp} be the set
of the cells that compose the territory partition. The vector of moves M
with s = |{(ci, cj)|ci is adjacent to cj}| positions is the vector containing all
possible moves. The element M [z] = (lci , lcj ) is the move from the cell ci to
the adjacent cell cj.
Now we are ready to define the frequency vector.
Definition 3.1.6 (Frequency Vector). Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cp} be the of the
cells that compose the territory partition and let M be the vector of moves.
Given a set of generalized trajectories in a time interval τ T G. The corre-
sponding frequency vector is the vector f with size s = |{(ci, cj)|ci is adjacent
to cj}| where each f [i] = GMF (T G ,M [i], τ).
The definition of frequency vector of a trajectory set is straightforward;
it requires to compute the function GMF instead of MF .
Clearly, the frequency vector of a generalized trajectory is the local data
vector computed by a node by using the local function MF .
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Note that the above definitions are based on the assumption that consec-
utive locations can be in the same cell or in adjacent cells. In some cases (for
example, because of GPS problems) this fact could not be true. We have to
choose what to do in case of these illegal moves (moves that are not present
in the Frequency Vector); a reasonable solution is to try to reconstruct the
missing part of the trajectories, e.g. by interpolation.
3.2 System Architecture
We use as reference architecture the distributed system described in Section
2.1. In our scenario, we want to allow analysts to better understand the
mobility behaviour in a city or territory, to monitor the traffic of vehicles,
and to take advantage of this knowledge to improve the infrastructure man-
agement enabling them, for example, to reduce traffic jams
The coordinator is responsible for computing the aggregation of movement
data on a territory by combining the information received by each node.
In order to obtain the aggregation of the movement data in the central-
ized setting, we need to generalize all the trajectories by using the cells of
a partition of the territory. In our distributed setting we assume that the
partition of the territory, i.e., the set of cells C = {c1, . . . , cp} used for the
generalization, is both known by all the nodes and the coordinator.
In a given time interval, each node, that represents a vehicle that moves
in this territory, collects a set of spatio-temporal points; these points com-
pose one or more trajectories (Definition 3.1.1). The node generalizes these
locations (Definition 3.1.2), and computes the frequency vector (Definition
3.1.3), thus contributing to the computation of the global frequency vector
(Definition 3.1.4) representing the movement data aggregation.
Formally, each remote node Vj (with j ∈ {1, . . . , k}) observes local up-
date streams that incrementally render a distinct frequency distribution vec-
tor fVj over data elements; that is, fVj [v] denotes the frequency of the ele-
ment v observed locally at remote node Vj . Then, the coordinator computes
the global frequency distribution vector F =
∑k
j=1 f
Vj .
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3.3 Differential Privacy Model
In Section 1.2 we introduced Differential Privacy and we provided an intu-
itive definition of it.
Let a database D include a private data record di about an individual i.
By querying the database, it is possible to obtain certain information I(D)
about all data and information I(D-di) about the data without the record di.
The difference between I(D) and I(D-di) may enable to infer some private
information about the individual i. Hence, it must be guaranteed that I(D)
and I(D-di) do not significantly differ for any individual i.
The formal definition [35] is the following. We recall that the parameter
 specifies the level of privacy guaranteed.
Definition 3.3.1 (-differential privacy). A privacy mechanism A gives -
differential privacy if for any dataset D1 and D2 differing on at most one
record, and for any possible output D′ of A we have
Pr[A(D1) = D
′] ≤ e × Pr[A(D2) = D′]
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A.
The fundamental concept of this technique is the global sensitivity of a
function mapping underlying datasets to (vectors of) reals.
Intuitively the global sensitivity represents how much the result of a
query can change when it is performed on the dataset or on a dataset close
to it.
Definition 3.3.2 (Global Sensitivity). For any function f : D → Rd, the
sensitivity of f is
∆f = maxD1,D2 ||f(D1)− f(D2)||1
for all D1, D2 differing in at most one record.
The mechanism of Differential Privacy works by adding appropriately
chosen random noise to the answer a=f(D), where f is the query function
and D is the database. We already said in Section 1.2 that the Laplace
mechanism is especially used when data are real, so in this work we focus
on it. Instead of returning the true answer, we return f(D) + Lap(∆f ).
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Figure 3.1: Probability Density Function as the scale changes
Note that decreasing , a publicly known parameter, flattens out the Lap(∆f )
curve; when  is fixed, functions f with high sensitivity yield again flatter
curves.
The magnitude of the noise drawn from a Laplace distribution with the
probability density function p(x|λ) = 12λe−|x|/λ, where λ is the scale factor,
depends on both the global sensitivity of f and the desired privacy level
 (i.e. λ = ∆f ). In general, when λ increases, the curve becomes flatter,
thus the peak is lower but the spread is greater (see Figure 3.1). This yields
higher expected noise magnitudes.
Formally the following result holds.
Theorem 3.3.1. [35, 36] For any function f : D → Rd over an arbi-
trary domain D, the mechanism A A(D) = f(D) + Laplace(∆f/) gives
-differential privacy.
A relaxed version of differential privacy allows claiming the same privacy
level as Definition 3.3.1 in the case there is a small amount of privacy loss
(due to a variation in the output distribution for the privacy mechanism A).
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This is discussed in [13] and its definition is the following:
Definition 3.3.3 ((, δ)-differential privacy). A privacy mechanism A gives
-differential privacy if for any dataset D1 and D2 differing on at most one
record, and for any possible output D′ of A we have
Pr[A(D1) = D
′] ≤ e × Pr[A(D2) = D′] + δ
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A.
Note that, if δ = 0, (, 0)-differential privacy is -differential privacy.
3.4 Privacy Model
We consider as sensitive information any information from which the typical
mobility behavior of a user may be inferred. This information is considered
sensitive for two main reasons: 1) typical movements can be used to identify
the drivers who drive specific vehicles even when a simple de-identification
of the individual in the system is applied; and 2) the places visited by a
driver could identify specific sensitive areas such as clinics, hospitals and
routine locations such as the user’s home and workplace.
In our setting, we assume that each node in our system is honest; in other
words we do not consider attacks at the node level. We also assume that
the coordinator is untrusted. There are two types of untrusted coordina-
tors: (i) semi-honest coordinator who will try to infer the sensitive mobility
information from the inputs of nodes, but otherwise follows the protocol
correctly, and (ii) malicious coordinator who may have arbitrary auxiliary
information to help break the protocol. For example, the coordinator may
be able to obtain real mobility statistic information from other sources, such
as from public datasets on the web, or through personal knowledge about
a specific participant [79]. In this paper, we focus on designing a privacy-
preserving technique to defend against a semi-honest coordinator. With this
weaker assumption about the coordinator’s reliability, we aim at designing
privacy-preserving techniques that can provide meaningful data utility.
Unfortunately, releasing frequency of moves instead of raw trajectory
data to the coordinator is not privacy-preserving, as the intruder may still
infer the sensitive typical movement information of the driver. As an ex-
ample, the attacker could learn the driver’s most frequent move; this infor-
mation can be very sensitive because such move usually corresponds to a
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user’s transportation between home and work place. Therefore, our goal is
to compute a distributed aggregation of movement data for a comprehensive
exploration of them while preserving privacy. In particular, we aim to find
effective privacy mechanisms to protect the frequency information associ-
ated to each move. For this purpose, we use the Differential Privacy, the
paradigm formally described in Section 3.3.
Our problem can be defined formally as the following.
Definition 3.4.1 (Problem Definition). Given a set of cells C = {c1, . . . , cp}
and a set V = {V1, . . . Vk} of vehicles, the privacy-preserving distributed
movement data aggregation problem (DMAP) consists in computing, in a
specific time interval τ , the
f τDMAP (V ) = [f1, f2, . . . , fs]
(where fi = GMF (T G ,M [i], τ) and s = |{(ci, cj)|ci is adjacent to cj}|) while
preserving privacy. Here, T G is the set of generalized trajectories related to
the k vehicles V in the time interval τ and M is the vector of moves defined
on the set of cells C.
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Privacy-Aware Distributed
Mobility Data Analytics
In this chapter, we provide a detailed description of three privacy-aware
data transformation methods we propose to protect the individual privacy of
each user participating to our distributed analytical process. Each solution
is characterized by a different trade-off between privacy and data utility.
Moreover, we formally study the privacy guarantees of the various methods.
4.1 Approach Overview
In this thesis, we propose different privacy-preserving solutions based on dif-
ferential privacy, which is a strong privacy model independent of the back-
ground knowledge of an adversary. Each of our solutions is characterized by
a different trade-off between privacy and data utility. In the following, we
describe the key ideas of these three solutions, including the computation
by each node and by the coordinator respectively. The node computation
mainly involves transforming data to achieve the desired privacy guarantee.
We present three privacy-preserving data transformation approaches. The
first one, named UniversalNoise, is based on the classical -differential pri-
vacy. It can provide strong privacy guarantees but high loss of data utility,
due to the generation of negative flows and noise of very high magnitude.
These two issues are managed in the second solution, named BoundedNoise,
by relaxing the privacy guarantee to (, δ)-differential privacy, where δ mea-
sures the privacy loss. We will show that: (1) the BoundedNoise approach
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can improve data utility significantly, and (2) in some cases, the Bounded-
Noise approach may provide a low level of guaranteed privacy in practice.
Indeed we can show that sometimes the privacy loss can be high. As a con-
sequence, we propose a third solution named BalancedNoise that tries to
maintain the balance between privacy and utility under control by setting
appropriate values of  and δ. The mechanism allows the nodes to specify
the level of privacy  and the maximum privacy loss δ and find the best
solution that is capable to minimize the noise magnitude and the possible
negative flows, so that it can achieve good utility. Besides the design of the
privacy-preserving data transformation methods, we also design sketching
approaches to reduce the communication between nodes and the coordina-
tor. In Chapter 5 we will validate our theoretical analyses with an extensive
set of experiments on large, real mobility data.
4.2 Privacy-Aware Node Computation
We assume that each node represents a vehicle that moves in a specific
territory. Each vehicle in a given time interval observes sequences of spatio-
temporal points (trajectories) and computes the corresponding frequency
vector that is to be sent to the coordinator. The node computation is com-
posed of two main steps, described in Algorithm 1: (a) the computation
of a privacy-preserving frequency vector and (b) the vector sketching that
compresses the information to be communicated with the coordinator.
Algorithm 1: NodeComputation(, τ , M , TG, w, d)
Data: A privacy budget , a time interval τ , the vector of the moves
M , a set of trajectories TG, the sketch dimensions w and d
Result: The sketch vector representing the privacy-preserving
frequency vector sk(f˜Vj )
// Privacy-Preserving Computation (Sec. 4.2.1-4.2.3);
f˜Vj = PrivacyTransformation(,M, TG, τ);
// Data Compression (Sec. 4.2.4);
sk(f˜Vj ) = SketchingAlgorithm(f˜Vj , w, d);
return sk(f˜Vj );
The first step, described in detail in Algorithm 2, is the challenging step
42
4.2.1 Trajectory Generalization
Algorithm 2: PrivacyTransformation(, M , TG, τ)
Input: A privacy budget , a time interval τ , the vector of the moves
M , a set of trajectories TG
Output: The privacy-preserving frequency vector f˜Vj
forall observed trajectory T ∈ TG do
// Trajectory Generalization (Sec. 4.2.1);
Tg = TrajectoryGeneralization(M,T );
// Update of the Frequency Vector fVj (Sec. 4.2.2);
forall move (lci , lcj ) ∈ Tg do
n = MF (Tg, (lci , lcj ), τ);
fVj [(lci , lcj )]+ = n;
// Transformation for achieving DP (Sec. 4.2.3);
f˜Vj = AchievingDP (fVj , , TG);
return f˜Vj ;
because it has to transform data to achieve privacy without destroying too
much of the data utility. It is composed of three phases: (1) trajectory
generalization; (2) frequency vector construction; and (3) frequency vector
transformation to achieve differential privacy. We describe the details of
these three phases in Section 4.2.1 - 4.2.3 respectively, and discuss the details
of the vector sketching step in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Trajectory Generalization
Given a specific division of the territory, a trajectory is generalized in the
following way. We apply a place-based division of the trajectory into seg-
ments. The area c1 containing its first point l1 is found. Then, the second
and following points of the trajectory are checked for being inside c1 until
we find a point li not contained in c1. For this point li, the containing area
c2 is found.
The trajectory segment from the first point to the i-th point is repre-
sented by the vector (c1, c2). Then, the procedure is repeated: the points
starting from li+1 are checked for containment in c2 until finding a point lk
outside c2, the area c3 containing lk is found, and so forth up to the last
point of the trajectory.
In the result, the trajectory is represented by the sequence of moves
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(c1, c2, t1, t2)(c2, c3, t2, t3) . . . (cm−1, cm, tm−1, tm). Here, in a specific quadru-
ple, ti is the time moment of the last position in ci and tj is the time moment
of the last position in cj . There may also be cases when all points of a trajec-
tory are contained in one and the same area c1. If this is the case, the whole
trajectory is represented by the sequence {c1}. Since globally we want to
compute aggregation of moves, we discard this kind of trajectories. More-
over, as most of the methods for analysis of trajectories are suited to work
with positions specified as points, the areas {c1, c2, . . . , cm} are replaced, for
practical purposes, by the sequence lc1 , lc2 , . . . , lcm consisting of the centroids
of the areas {c1, c2, . . . , cm}.
4.2.2 Frequency Vector Construction
After the generalization of a trajectory, the node computes the Move Fre-
quency function (Definition 3.1.3) for each move (lci , lcj ) in that trajectory
and updates its frequency vector fVj associated to the current time interval
τ . Intuitively, the vehicle populates the frequency vector fVj according to
the generalized trajectory observed. Therefore, at the end of the time inter-
val τ , the element fVj [i] contains the number of times that the vehicle Vj
moved from m to n in the given time interval τ , if M [i] = (m,n).
4.2.3 Privacy-preserving Vector Transformation
As we stated in Section 3.4, if a node sends the original frequency vector
without any data transformation to the coordinator, the intruder may still
be able to infer the sensitive typical movements of the vehicle represented
by the node. Clearly, the generalization step can help to protect the pri-
vacy of drivers but it depends on the density of the area. Specifically, if
the area is not so dense, the attacker could identify a few candidates of the
locations that the driver has been to. In this case, the privacy is at high risk
to be breached, though it is possible to use some precaution by obtaining a
suitable tessellation of the territory taking into account the density of areas
(see Section 5.2 for more details). An attacker could also infer if during
a trip a user went from a location a to a location b and how many times.
The questions are, how can we hide the event that the user moved from a
location a to a location b during a trip in the time interval τ? And how can
we hide the real count of moves in that time window? To answer these ques-
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tions, we propose three solutions based on a rigorous privacy model named
-differential privacy (Section 3.3). Each solution provides a different bal-
ance between privacy and data utility.
4.2.3.1 Computation of Sensitivity
The key point of the entire differential privacy model is the definition of the
sensitivity. Recall that in our setting each trajectory is transformed into a
generalized one and a vehicle can go from cell a to cell b more than once
during a trajectory. Therefore, the frequency count of each move can be any
arbitrary non-negative integer number. We also recall that the frequency
count of move (la, lb) by node nj is equal to
f =
∑
∀Tgi
MF (Tgi , (lca , lcb), τ),
where Tgi is one of the generalized trajectories of nj in the time interval
τ and lca and lcb denote the pair of spatial coordinates representing the
centroids of the cells that la and lb locate in respectively.
If we only want to hide the real value of single moves, we treat the flow of
each move separately; in this case, adding or removing a single movement
from a to b influences the count of the move (a, b) (and thus the response
to an hypothetical query performed on the data containing that element or
not) exactly by 1. Therefore, in this move-based reasoning, the sensitivity
is set to 1. On the other hand, we might look for greater protection, and
then a possible solution is to reason in terms of moves in a trajectory (we
call this approach trajectory-based reasoning). In particular, we want to
capture the following case: how does the move frequency count (for any
single user) change if an entire trajectory (for that user) is present or not in
the data? Obviously, the sensitivity of a move frequency count depends on
the occurrence of that move in each user trajectory. In a time interval τ for
a given vehicle (node) we can have different trips or trajectories (we have a
trajectory when the user starts from a location and stops at another). We
argue that adding or deleting one trajectory of nj can affect the count of
move (la, lb) by at most max
i=1,...,q
(MF (Tgi , (lca , lcb), τ)). Therefore, let q be the
number of trajectories and τ be the time interval, then the sensitivity of
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move (lca , lcb) is:
∆f = max
i=1,...,q
MF (Tgi , (lca , lcb), τ). (4.1)
Note that the frequency count f of move (lca , lcb) always satisfies that
f ≥ ∆f , as f = ∑
i=1,...,q
(MF (Tgi , (lca , lcb), τ)).
Given the sensitivity (either fixed to 1 or computed by Equation 4.1) we
can define a differential private mechanism in various ways. In the following,
we generically refer to the method Compute Sensitivity, thus indicating that
sensitivity can be indifferently a move-based sensitivity or a trajectory-based
sensitivity. We present three solutions, each one corresponding to a different
implementation of the function AchievingDP in Algorithm 2.
4.2.3.2 UniversalNoise Approach
Our first approach, named UniversalNoise, is based on the classic -differential
privacy model. In particular, at the end of the time interval τ , before send-
ing the frequency vector to the coordinator, each node adds the Laplace
noise Lap(∆f ), where ∆f is defined as explained in Section 4.2.3.1, to each
element in the frequency vector the value in that position of the vector.
At the end of this step the node transforms fVj into f˜Vj . This process is
described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: UniversalNoise(fVj , , TG)
Input: A frequency vector fVj , a privacy budget , a set of
trajectories TG
Output: The privacy-preserving frequency vector f˜Vj
forall vector element fVj [k] do
// Compute Sensitivity (Sec. 4.2.3.1);
∆f = ComputeSensitivity(T G,M [k]) //M = moves-vector of fVj;
noise = Laplace(∆f );
f˜Vj [k] = fVj [k] + noise;
return f˜Vj ;
Privacy Analysis. We are ready to show that Algorithm 2 with the privacy
transformation presented just now satisfies -differential privacy.
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Theorem 4.2.1. Given the total privacy budget , for each frequency value
x, UniversalNoise approach ensures -differential privacy.
The correctness of Theorem 4.2.1 is straightforward due to how the noise
is added according to the Laplace mechanism [36].
4.2.3.3 BoundedNoise Approach
The UniversalNoise approach has a few weaknesses. First, it could lead to
the destruction of the data utility because of the added noise that, although
with small probability, can reach arbitrary magnitude. Second, adding
noise drawn from the Laplace distribution could generate negative frequency
counts of moves, which does not make sense in our setting. To fix these two
problems, we propose the second approach, named BoundedNoise approach,
that bounds the noise drawn from the Laplace distribution. In particular,
for each value x of the vector fVj , we draw the noise from Lap(∆f ) bounded
to the interval [−x, x]. In other words, for any original frequency fVj [i] = x,
its perturbed version after adding noise should be in the interval [0, 2x]. By
doing this, we reduce the amounts of utility loss due to adding noise, as
described in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: BoundedNoise(fVj , , TG)
Input: A frequency vector fVj , a privacy budget , a set of
trajectories TG
Output: The privacy-preserving frequency vector f˜Vj
forall vector element fVj [k] do
// Compute Sensitivity (Sec. 4.2.3.1);
∆f = ComputeSensitivity(T G,M [k]) //M = moves-vector of fVj;
noise = Laplace(∆f );
while (noise > fVj [k]) or (noise < −fVj [k]) do
noise = Laplace(∆f );
f˜Vj [k] = fVj [k] + noise;
return f˜Vj ;
We are aware that using a truncated version of the Laplace distribution
may lead to privacy leakage. In the following we show that the BoundedNoise
approach satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy, where δ measures the privacy
loss.
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Privacy Analysis. As pointed out in [51], differential privacy must be
applied with caution. The privacy protection provided by differential privacy
relates to the data generating mechanism and deterministic aggregate level
background knowledge. We observe that bounding the Laplace noise will
lead to some privacy leakage on some values. For instance, from the noisy
frequency values that are large, the attacker can infer that these values
should not be transformed from small ones. To analyze the privacy leakage
of our BoundedNoise approach, we first explain the concept of statistical
distance [13]. Formally, given two distributions X and Y , the statistical
distance between X and Y over a set U is defined as
d(X,Y ) = max
S∈U
(Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]).
[13] also shows the relationship between (, δ)-differential privacy and
the statistical distance.
Lemma 4.2.1. [13] Given two probabilistic functions F and G with the
same input domain, where F is (, δ1)-differentially private. If for all possible
inputs x we have that the statistical distance on the output distributions of
F and G is:
d(F (x), G(x)) ≤ δ2,
then G is (, δ1 + (e
 + 1)δ2)-differentially private.
Let F and F ′ be the frequency distribution before and after adding
Laplace noise. We can show that the statistical distance between F and F ′
can be bounded as follows:
Lemma 4.2.2. [13] Given an (, δ)-differentially private function F with
F (x) = f(x) + R for a deterministic function f and a random variable
R. Then for all x, the statistical distance between F and its throughput-
respecting variant F ′ with the bound b on R is at most
d(F (x)− F ′(x)) ≤ Pr[|R| > b].
[13] has the following lemma to bound the probability Pr[|R| > b].
Lemma 4.2.3. [13] Given a function F with F (x) = f(x) +Lap(∆f ) for a
deterministic function f , the probability that the Laplacian noise Lap(∆f )
applied to f is larger than b is bounded by:
Pr(|Lap(∆f

)| > b) ≤ 2(∆f)
2
b22
.
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This upper bound is not tight. For instance, when ∆f = 1, b = 1, and
 = 1, the bound 2(∆f)
2
x22
= 2. Therefore, we improve the bound by the
following theorem.
Lemma 4.2.4. Given a function F with F (x) = f(x) + Lap(∆f ) for a
deterministic function f , and a Laplace distribution with zero-mean, the
probability that the Laplacian noise Lap(∆f ) applied to f is larger than b is
bounded by:
Pr
(∣∣∣Lap(∆f

)∣∣∣ > b) ≤ e−b∆f .
Proof. Let λ = ∆f . The probability density function is p(x) =
1
2λe
(−|x|/λ)
and the cumulative distribution function is
D(x) =
1
2
(1 + sgn(x)(1− e−|x|λ )).
Therefore,
Pr
(∣∣∣Lap(∆f

)∣∣∣ > b) = ∫ ∞
b
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ dx (4.2)
=
1
2λ
(∫ ∞
0
e−
|x|
λ dx−
∫ b
0
e−
|x|
λ dx
)
= D(∞)−D(b)
= e−
b
λ .
Our analysis shows that e
−b
∆f ≤ 2(∆f)2
b22
, i.e., our bound is tighter than
that in [13]. We stress that in our approach, the bound b of each frequency
value x is not fixed. Indeed, b = x. Therefore, each frequency value x has
different amounts of privacy leakage. Our approach thus achieves different
degree of (, δ)-differentially privacy guarantee on each frequency value x.
Theorem 4.2.2 shows more details.
Theorem 4.2.2. Given the privacy budget , for each frequency value x,
BoundedNoise approach ensures
(
, (e + 1)e
−x
∆f
)
-differentially privacy.
Note that the frequency vectors with Laplace noise (without truncation)
satisfy (, 0)-differentially privacy.
The correctness of Theorem 4.2.2 can be easily proven by Lemma 4.2.1
and Lemma 4.2.4. Note that the frequency vectors with Laplace noise (with-
out truncation) satisfies (, 0)-differentially privacy. It is easy to verify that
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the privacy loss, measured as δ = (e+1)e
−x
∆f , can be high. More details are
as following. Recall that for any frequency count x, x ≥ ∆f always holds.
Next we discuss by cases that x = ∆f and x > ∆f . For the former case
that x = ∆f , δ = (1 + e−) > 1, i.e., the privacy loss is always grater than
1. For the latter case that x > ∆f , δ = e
(
1− x
∆f
)

+ e
−x
∆f . In this case, δ > 1
holds when x < ln(e
+1)∆f
 . In other words, smaller frequency counts have
a higher probability to get larger amounts of privacy loss. The situation
improves a lot when the x value increases. As an example considering x = 6
with  = 0.3 and sensitivity ∆f = 1 the privacy loss becomes δ = 0.16.
Although this approach is very promising for the data utility it could be not
suitable for situations where very low values of frequency are frequent. As a
consequence, below we present our third solution capable to better manage
the very important trade-off between privacy and utility.
4.2.3.4 BalancedNoise Approach
As discussed above, the UniversalNoise approach may provide a strong pri-
vacy guarantee but poor data utility, while the BoundedNoise approach can
improve data utility but with a possible high privacy loss. Our third ap-
proach, named BalancedNoise, tries to address the trade-off issue between
privacy and data utility. The BalancedNoise approach, described in Algo-
rithm 5, allows the user to set the desirable values for the two parameters,
the privacy budget threshold  and the privacy loss threshold δ. In other
words, we find the smallest interval [−b, b] such that the following inequality
holds:
(e + 1)e
−b
∆f ≤ δ.
Note that e
−b
∆f is the privacy loss we found in Lemma 4.2.4. This implies
that
b ≥ −∆f

ln
δ
e + 1
.
After finding the interval, for each value x of the frequency vector, the
node draws the noise from Lap(∆f ) bounding the noise value to the interval
[−b, b], where b = −∆f ln δe+1 . Note that this solution limits as much as
possible the generation of noise with values of too high magnitude while
it does not completely solves the problem of the negative flows. Clearly,
the possibility to compute the minimum interval that better fits the user
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privacy requirements also helps to limit the negative flows (as confirmed by
our experiments reported in Section 5.4.3).
Privacy Analysis. Similar to the BoundedNoise approach, the Balanced-
Noise approach described in Algorithm 5 satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
Algorithm 5: BalancedNoise(fVj , , TG, )
Input: A frequency vector fVj , a privacy budget , a set of
trajectories TG, the privacy loss δ
Output: The privacy-preserving frequency vector f˜Vj
Compute b = −∆f ln
δ
e+1 ;
forall vector element fVj [k] do
// Compute Sensitivity (Sec. 4.2.3.1);
∆f = ComputeSensitivity(T G,M [k]) //M = moves-vector of fVj;
noise = Laplace(∆f );
while (noise > b) or (noise < −b) do
noise = Laplace(∆f );
f˜Vj [k] = fVj [k] + noise;
return f˜Vj ;
4.2.4 Vector Sketching for Compact Communications
In a distributed system an important issue to be considered is the amount
of data that needs to be communicated. In fact, real life systems usually
involve thousands of vehicles (nodes) that are located in any place of the
territory. Each vehicle has to send to the coordinator the information con-
tained in its frequency vector that has a size depending on the number of
cells that represent the partitions of the territory. The number of cells in
a territory can be very huge and this can lead to large frequency vectors.
Therefore, the system has to be able to handle not only a very large num-
ber of nodes but also huge amounts of informations to be communicated.
These considerations make the optimization of communicated information
necessary.
We propose the application of sketching methods that allow us to apply a
good compression of the information to be communicated. In particular, we
propose the application of AGMS, Count-Min or Count sketch algorithms,
introduced in Section 2.2. In Chapter 5 we empirically study the effect of
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the data compression obtained with each one of these algorithms on the
data utility in order to identify the best one for our final goal, that is to
find a good trade-off between privacy and utility of the mobility analysis. In
general, these algorithms map a frequency vector f onto a more compressed
vector. The general pseudocode of this step is described in Algorithm 6;
each method differs from the others in implementation details, due to the
structure of the sketch, as formerly described.
Algorithm 6: SketchingAlgorithm(f˜Vj ,w,d)
Input: A differential-private frequency vector f˜Vj , the number of
columns w, the number of rows d
Output: The sketched frequency vector sk(f˜Vj )
generate hash functions;
forall vector element f˜Vj [k] do
update sk(f˜Vj );
return sk(f˜Vj );
Adding this data summarization step (the last step in Algorithm 1) does
not change the privacy guarantee provided by the above methods. This
is due to the fact that the sketching function only accesses a differentially
private frequency vector, not the underlying database. As proven by Hay
et al. [45], a post-processing of differentially private results remains differ-
entially private. Therefore, also the whole Algorithm 1 with the sketching
step maintains the same privacy guarantee of Algorithm 2.
4.3 Coordinator Computation
The computation of the coordinator is composed of two main phases: 1)
computation of the set of moves and 2) computation of the aggregation of
global movements.
Move Vector Computation. The coordinator in an initial setup phase
has to send to the nodes the vector of moves (Definition 3.1.5). The compu-
tation of this vector depends on the set of cells that represent the partition
of the territory. This partition can be a simple grid or a more sophisticated
territory subdivision such as Voronoi tessellation. The sharing of vector of
moves is a requirement of the whole process because each node has to use
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the same data structure to allow for the correct computation of the global
flows on the coordinator’s part.
Global Flow Computation. The coordinator has to compute the global
vector that corresponds to the global aggregation of movement data in a
given time interval τ by composing all the local frequency vectors. It re-
ceives the sketched vector sk(f˜Vj ) from each node; then it reconstructs each
frequency vector from the sketched vector, by using the estimation described
in Section 2.2. Finally, the coordinator computes the global frequency vec-
tor by summing the estimate vectors component by component. Clearly
the estimated global vector is an approximated version of the global vector
obtained by summing the local frequency vectors after the privacy transfor-
mation only.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation on Real Big Data
This chapter shows the empirical results we obtained applying our ap-
proaches on a large dataset of real GPS vehicles traces, collected by Octo
Telematics. We have evaluated the three methods presented in Chapter 4,
from the point of view of both data utility and privacy-preservation, and we
empirically show how the trade-off between these two goals changes in the
different proposals, by confirming the theoretical results.
In particular, in this chapter: first, we describe some characteristics of
the selected trajectories and of the tessellation; second, we introduce the
utility measures analyzed; and finally, we show how our methods behave
with respect to these measures.
5.1 Dataset Description
For our experiments we used GPS vehicles traces collected in a period from
1st May to 31st May 2011. In our simulation, the coordinator collects the
frequency vectors (FV) from all the vehicles to determine the Global Fre-
quency Vector (GFV), i.e. the sum all the trajectories crossing any link, at
the end of each day. Thus we defined a series of time intervals τi, where
each τi spans over a single day. Note that we conducted experiments on
data by considering different time intervals τ : 4 hours, one day and 2 days.
Since the results we found in terms of data utility are very similar, in the
following we only report the results concerning τ equal to one day, i.e. the
25th May 2011.
The GPS traces were collected in the geographical areas around Pisa. We
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randomly selected around 4, 200 vehicles out of a total of about 49, 000 ve-
hicles. This led to the generation of around 15, 700 trips (trajectories) in
the selected day. Furthermore, we use a territory tessellation of about 2, 400
cells; so, considering as possible moves only pairs of adjacent cells we obtain
frequency vectors containing about 15, 900 positions (moves).
Concerning the frequency vectors constructed by all users (vehicles), we have
that the majority (about 99%) of the moves are zero (this fact implies that
vectors are very sparse), while the effective distribution of the non-zero ele-
ments of all users is reported in Figure 5.1. We observe that a high number
of these moves consists of very low flows. Indeed, the mean of non-zero
moves is 1.13 and the median is 1. This fact is reasonable because taking
a time window of one day, a typical user visits few places: we have chosen
a working day, therefore trips shall be mostly from home to workplace and
vice versa.
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Figure 5.1: Percentage of moves that have a certain flow
Note that all the considered trajectories have at least one move and as a
consequence at least one non-zero value in the frequency vector; trajectories
that did not satisfy this requirement were discarded in a preprocessing phase.
This is not a limitation, because in our framework these cases are discarded
by the node during the Trajectory Generalization step, as stated in Section
4.2.1.
5.2 Spatial Tessellation
The generalization and aggregation of movement data is based on space
partitioning. Arbitrary territory divisions, such as administrative districts
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or regular grids, do not reflect the spatial distribution of the data. The
resulting aggregations may not convey the essential spatial and quantitative
properties of the traffic flows over the territory. Our method for territory
partitioning extends the data-driven method suggested in paper [12]. Using
a given sample of points (which may be, for example, randomly selected
from a historical set of movement data), the original method finds spatial
clusters of points that can be enclosed by circles with a user-chosen radius.
The centroids of the clusters are then taken as generating seeds for Voronoi
tessellation of the territory. We have modified the method so that dense
point clusters can be subdivided into smaller clusters, so that the sizes of
the resulting Voronoi polygons vary depending on the point density: large
polygons in data-sparse areas and small polygons in data-dense areas. The
method requires the user to set 3 parameters: maximal radius R, mini-
mal radius r, and minimal number of points N allowing a cluster to be
subdivided. In our experiments, we used a tessellation with 2661 polygons
obtained with R = 10km, r = 500m, N = 80.
5.3 Utility Measures
To assess the information loss incurred to achieve privacy and to reduce the
amount of information to be transmitted, we study how much data utility
is preserved after the transformations. Since the coordinator reconstructs
the flows among the zones of the tessellation, we can represent such data as
a directed graph, where the nodes represent the zones and an edge between
two nodes represent the flows from one zone to the other. This graph-
based model allows us to analytically evaluate the resulting aggregations by
means of some network-based statistics, described below. The models can
also be exploited for different application scenarios and for each of them
we can evaluate the quality of results after the transformations, since these
mobility analyses can be performed on the transformed data too.
5.3.1 Network-based Measures
In order to assess the utility of the data collected by the coordinator we study
how the distributions of general network-based measures are preserved. In
particular we have considered the following measures:
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Flow per Link : this measure evaluates the volume of flow in each move
(edge of the network), i.e., traffic between two adjacent zones (we
simply sum the traffic flows for each edge).
Flow per Zone: this measure evaluates the volume of flow in each zone
(node), i.e., for each zone we sum the flows of all the incoming and
outgoing flows in that zone.
Node Degree: [8, 66] this measure considers the distinct number of ori-
gins and destinations for each zone, thus focusing on the topological
properties of the resulting graph, i.e, for each zone of the territory we
compute the edges (with some traffic) incident to it.
Clustering Coefficient : [66] given a node the clustering coefficient is defined
as the probability that two randomly selected neighbors are connected
to each other. Formally,
CCci =
# pairs of neighbors connected by edges
# pairs of neighbors
.
Node Betweenness: [38] this function is a measure of a node’s centrality in
a network. It computes the number of shortest paths from all nodes
to all others that pass through that node. Formally,
NBTci =
∑
∀ (cj , ck),
cj 6= ci 6= ck
# shortest path between cj and ck pass through ci
# shortest path between cj and ck
.
Note that usually Node Betweenness values have high correlation with
Node Degree, i.e., to a higher Node Degree corresponds a higher Node
Betweenness value.
Edge Betweenness: [43] this function provides similar information to the
previous one, but considering the edge instead of the node. In other
words, it measures the edge’s centrality in a network, taking into
account the fraction of shortest paths between two nodes that pass
through an edge, over all pairs of vertices.
5.3.2 Mobility Application Scenarios
The reconstructed GVF enables a traffic manager to evaluate the traffic
condition by monitoring the status of the road network. We explored a vi-
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sualization approach where the measures Flow per Link and Flow per Zone
are rendered on a map. In particular, in Figure 5.2 (left) the Flow per Link
are presented as arrows whose thickness is proportional to the amount of
traffic on that link. The Flow per Zone (Figure 5.2 (right)) are rendered
with a circle whose radius is proportional to the median value of all the
zones and the color indicates if the flow is above (red) or below (cyan) the
median. These two graphical representations allow to easily identify the
portions of the road network with critical traffic conditions. These visu-
alizations, when performed on the values obtained after the privacy (and
sketching) transformations and compared with the original ones, allow us
to qualitatively evaluate the trade-off between data privacy and data util-
ity. Moreover, they provide examples of mobility analyses that can be done,
even with the private data.
Figure 5.2: Traffic and density analysis for original data
The transformed data has also been used to study the aggregation of
zones on the basis of their relative mobility, according to the approach pre-
sented in [72]. Starting from the graph-based model of flows, we apply
a community discovery algorithm on the data to determine the groups of
nodes strongly connected by high flows. We call such aggregation of zones
as Mobility Borders to stress the definition of a boundary derived from mo-
bility data. Mobility Borders have the aim to determine groups of regions
such that the inner movements within a group are more frequent than the
movements towards the other groups. In other words, this problem consists
in finding areas with a dense exchange of travelers between them and a low
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exchange of travelers across this set of areas, and this can then be reduced to
the problem of finding clusters of nodes that are densely connected internally
and sparsely connected with the rest of the network. The result of Mobility
Borders can be rendered visually by joining the geometries of the zones into
a larger polygon according to the group they belong to. Figure 5.3 shows
an example of this kind of analysis.
To analytically evaluate the goodness of the resulting clusters, we consider
two measures adapted from information retrieval research field: precision
and recall. With precision we measure the ratio of zones in the same group
in the original data that stay in the same group in the transformed one.
The recall measures the contribution of several original groups to a group
coming from transformed data.
Figure 5.3: Mobility Borders results for original data
5.4 Analytical evaluation
We now discuss the experiments conducted on the real-world data described
above. To evaluate the data quality after the transformation we compare the
transformed flows with the original ones. According to the utility measures
defined in Section 5.3, for each measure we compare the resulting statistics
for each node and edge of the graph-model resulting from transformed data
with the graph yielding from the original data.
We can use the scatter plots to highlight the differences between the
transformed data and the original ones; in these plots we also report the
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fitted regression line and its slope, to have a further indication of the quality
of the correlation.
To present the results more formally for different comparisons of parameters
and utility measures, we adopt the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC)
to represent analytically the amount of data perturbation introduced. The
coefficient ranges from -1 to 1: it tends to 1 when the data points are
close to the regression line; it tends to -1 when there is probably a reverse
correlation with regards to the regression line found; finally, it tends to zero
when the data points are scattered away from the line, i.e., there is no linear
correlation between the variables.
5.4.1 Impact of Sensitivity on Privacy Transformations
Now, we discuss and evaluate the impact of the sensitivity on the data
utility and privacy protection. In general, by increasing the sensitivity we
should have a better protection (as stated in Section 4.2.3); this is because
the scale factor increases when the sensitivity augments (see Section 3.3).
Clearly, this leads to the generation of noise of a higher magnitude. This
result is confirmed experimentally, even though the difference is not very
marked (see Table 5.1). The fact that the difference is small depends on the
characteristics of the dataset: several moves are equal to 1, therefore the
sensitivity is often equal to 1, also considering the trajectory-based reasoning.
average minimum maximum
move-based sensitivity 2.01656 0.0108814 9.85709
trajectory-based sensitivity 2.03846 0.0194095 10.1975
Table 5.1: Noise by varying the sensitivity, over 124, 772 values.
However, it is also important to take into account another aspect. In
the UniversalNoise approach, considering the move-based sensitivity (i.e, a
sensitivity always equal to 1), there is a substantial drop in the data utility,
because given a node the privacy transformation adds a noise quantity to
each edge, i.e., to each element of the frequency vector. The data utility
improves a lot when we consider the trajectory-based sensitivity which does
not add any noise value to edges where no flow is present. These edges have
sensitivity equal to 0 as defined in Equation 4.1 in Section 4.2.3.1. This
approach does not generate any privacy leak, because we do not consider as
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sensitive information the fact that a user did not travel along a certain edge.
In other words, our focus is on protecting the real movements because some
sensitive inferences could be hidden among those.
Figure 5.4 shows the scatter plots for the Flow per Link measure (Figure
5.4(a)&(b)) and the Flow per Zone measure (Figure 5.4(c)&(d)). Here, we
compare what happens when we apply the move-based sensitivity or the
trajectory-based sensitivity. We observe that though we chose large  (in
the figure  is equal to 0.9), i.e., less privacy, the correlation in the case of
move-based sensitivity (Figure 5.4(a)&(c)) is inexistent.
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Figure 5.4: Correlations of Flow per Link and Flow per Zone by varying
sensitivity in UniversalNoise
In Figure 5.5 are reported the visualizations of Flow per Link in the first
row and the visualizations of Flow per Zone in the second row. Note that
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Figures 5.5(a)&(d) illustrate the visualizations for the original data; Figures
5.5(b)&(e) show the visualizations for the perturbed data by Universal-
Noise and the move-based sensitivity ; and lastly, Figure 5.5(c)&(f) depict
the results for the perturbed data by UniversalNoise and the trajectory-
based sensitivity. Clearly, with the correlations obtained through the use of
move-based sensitivity, the visualizations introduced in Section 5.3.2 are not
meaningful.
Figure 5.5: Visualizations of Flow per Link and Flow per Zone by varying
sensitivity in UniversalNoise
Finally, with the purpose to find some property which is preserved, we
compute the PCC of all the network-based measures presented above. Un-
fortunately, when we use the move-based sensitivity (Figure 5.6 (left)), the
correlations are extremely low, therefore we can argue that there is no simi-
larity between the original and the perturbed values. However, the correla-
tions obtained using the trajectory-based sensitivity (Figure 5.6 (right)) are
promising: this case will be discussed in detail in Section 5.4.3.
Note that this difference in terms of data utility between move-based sensi-
tivity and trajectory-based sensitivity does not appear in the BoundedNoise
method, because in that method the perturbed flow always lies between 0
and the double of the original flow (so the zero-moves are never altered),
while it resurfaces again in the BalancedNoise approach.
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Figure 5.6: Correlations of network-based measures by varying sensitivity
in UniversalNoise
5.4.2 Privacy and Utility of BoundedNoise Approach
In this section we show our evaluation of the BoundedNoise approach in
terms of both privacy guarantee and data utility. Our experiments on real
data confirm the theoretical results, described in Section 4.2.3.3, concerning
the privacy loss related to the BoundedNoise approach. Indeed, we observed
that usually in a time interval of one day each user has a high set of moves
with low value in its frequency vector, because typical users go from an area
to another only few times during the day. This implies that the application
of the BoundedNoise method may lead to a too high privacy loss, due to
unacceptable δ values. We might have privacy leaks if the δ values is greater
than 1, and using the move-based sensitivity this happens in 99% of cases.
Unfortunately, also using the trajectory-based sensitivity the situation does
not highly improve: in Figure 5.7 (left) we plot the percentage of cases
where we have a resulting δ higher than 1, which is unreasonable for privacy
protection. We divided the events edge by edge, depending on the sensitivity
value; especially, for each sensitivity value, we plot (with respect to the total
number of edges that have that sensitivity) the percentage of cases where
the flow is equal to the sensitivity and the percentage of cases where the
flow is greater than the sensitivity value, but less than the ratio explained
in the theoretical analysis. As the sensitivity increases, the percentage of the
first case tends to decrease because it is likely that in these circumstances a
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Figure 5.7: Study of the privacy loss in BoundedNoise
user has many trajectories, and therefore the flow on the edge in the whole
time window is greater than one in a single trajectory. Note that the peak
at sensitivity equal to 10 corresponds to only two people who actually have
gone through an edge 10 times in a single trajectory. In Figure 5.7 (right),
we also noted that when we increase the time interval τ the privacy loss
decreases and this supports our hypothesis that this naive approach can
give a good trade-off between privacy and data utility in scenarios where
it is reasonable to have a wide time window, for example one week, and in
contexts which are characterized by high frequencies of items.
In addition, enlarging the time window, the frequencies of the moves increase
and this is confirmed by the study shown in Figure 5.8, where we can see
the percentage of the moves with value 1 with respect to the total non-
zero moves, selecting time windows of one day, two days and one week
(respectively: red, green and blue points).
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Figure 5.9: Correlation of network-based measures in BoundedNoise
However, the utility provided by BoundedNoise method is very good, as
showed in Figure 5.9, where it is reported the PCC for each network-based
measure computed on the for different values of . The two plots in this
figure show that the values of the PCC obtained after the application of the
BoundedNoise with either the trajectory-based sensitivity or the move-based
sensitivity are substantially equivalent. For this reason in the following pic-
tures we show the other analyses only with respect to the results regarding
the utility obtained by the trajectory-based sensitivity. Note that the results
obtained by move-based sensitivity are very similar. In Figure 5.10 we com-
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Figure 5.10: Correlations of Flow per Link and Flow per Zone in Bounded-
Noise, with  = 0.01
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pare the values of each edge (left) and of each node (right) before and after
the privacy-transformation; while in Figure 5.11 we have rendered the Flow
per Link measure and the Flow per Zone measure on the map. We chose to
show these results of a very low epsilon ( = 0.01) with the aim to emphasize
the very good quality of mobility analysis that an analyst can obtain even
if the data are transformed by using a very low  value.
Figure 5.11: Visualization of Flow per Link and Flow per Zone in Bound-
edNoise, with  = 0.01
5.4.3 Data Utility for UniversalNoise and BalancedNoise
Approches
In this section we analyze the two transformation methods UniversalNoise
and BalancedNoise, respectively presented in Section 4.2.3.2 and Section
4.2.3.4. We have already explained in Section 5.4.1 that the UniversalNoise
approach does not give good results when the move-based sensitivity is used,
so now we will analyze the case in which each vehicle uses the trajectory-
based sensitivity. In order to provide a fair comparison, the same sensitivity
is also used in the analysis of the BalancedNoise method; we do not present
the results for the move-based sensitivity because in terms of data utility
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they are very similar to those obtained by using trajectory-based sensitivity
and in terms of privacy the last one offers better protection.
First of all, we want to conclude the study started in the Section 5.4.1
(in Figure 5.4) by showing the scatter plots of the Flow per Link measure for
other two transformations, namely  = 0.5
(
Figure 5.12 (left)
)
and  = 0.2(
Figure 5.12 (right)
)
. The scatter plots highlight the differences between
the two transformations, where the more protective transformation ( = 0.2)
perturbs the data the most, since the data points tend to go far from the
fitting line.
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Figure 5.12: Correlations of Flow per Link after UniversalNoise
Furthermore, we want to point out that the intuition that Balanced-
Noise helps to limit the negative flow values is further confirmed by our
experiments, as highlighted in Table 5.2, which shows the negative noise
obtained in the global frequency vector. We fixed  = 0.5, but this behavior
is maintained for every other . The first line simply reports the number of
negative noise values obtained, while the second line presents the average
of these values. As one can see, both the number and the size of the noise
values obtained decrease with an increase of δ.
UniversalNoise
BalancedNoise
δ=0.05 δ=0.1 δ=0.2 δ=0.3 δ=0.5
number 1,407 1,334 1,227 1,032 957 743
average -3.178 -2.632 -2.223 -1.756 -1.657 -1.097
Table 5.2: Negative noise obtained with various executions, for  = 0.5.
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After these remarks, we describe the results obtained on the basis of the
measures introduced in the Section 5.3.
Network-based Measures Distributions. To assess the validity of
the transformation approach, we compare the private data with the original
data by varying the transformation parameters. The comparison is per-
formed with two approaches by varying the values of  and δ: we compare
the resulting cumulative distribution of the utility measures and the linear
correlations by means of the PCC. In the figures from Figure 5.13 to Fig-
ure 5.17 (on the left sides) we report, for each utility measure, the resulting
distributions for  = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 and for the original data. From such
plots it is possible to estimate the best parameters that yield a good trade-off
between data protection and data utility. Furthermore, in the same figures
(on the right sides) we report the distributions for original data, for data
perturbed with the UniversalNoise method (using  equal to 0.2 and 0.3)
and for the data perturbed with the BalancedNoise technique, by fixing 
to 0.2 and by varying δ between 0.05 and 0.2. These comparisons are im-
portant in order to show how you can get the same quality decreasing  and
increasing δ, then to show, in the practice, how the BalancedNoise allows to
manage the balance between privacy and data quality.
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Figure 5.13: Flow per Link Distributions
For example, for the Flow per Link measure (Figure 5.13(a)), we can notice
a clear discontinuity for  = 0.2 and  = 0.1, suggesting that a good value for
 would be 0.3. However, it is interesting to note how the δ parameter may
contribute to increase data utility. In fact, considering a more protective
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value for , say  = 0.2, it is possible increase δ to augment the resulting
data utility. In Figure 5.13(b), for instance, we can see how the distributions
tend to be similar to the curve for  = 0.3 when we increase δ. In particular,
when δ = 0.2 the curve is very similar to  = 0.3 even with a difference on
the tails of the two curves.
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Figure 5.14: Flow per Zone Distributions
Similar results can be observed for Flow per Zone measure (Figure 5.14),
where the candidate value for  is again 0.3. Also in this case, the δ param-
eter contributes to enhance the data protection by lowering the value for 
to 0.2 and increasing δ to 0.2.
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Figure 5.15: Clustering Coefficient Distributions
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The Clustering Coefficient measure is very robust even for low values of 
(Figure 5.15): we can appreciate a different distribution only when  = 0.1.
This property confirms that the privacy transformation may perturb the
local weight of edges but in general it preserves the topology of the graph.
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Figure 5.16: Betweenness Distributions
Another evidence of this phenomenon is given by the two measures of be-
tweenness (Figure 5.16), where we can appreciate how the different param-
eters yield similar distribution. This means, for example, that the number
of relevant edges within the graph is maintained across different transfor-
mations.
This is evident also from the distribution of the Node Degree measure (Fig-
ure 5.17), where we can notice how the number of neighbors for each node
tend to diminish when  becomes smaller. We can relate this property to
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the pruning of some graph components that, however, are not relevant for
the connectivity of the graph.
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Figure 5.17: Node Degree Distributions
Network-based Measures Correlations. Besides the general distri-
butions of the utility measures, we also want to determine how each compo-
nent of the graph is transformed locally. Figure 5.18 shows, for each utility
measure, the resulting PCC for different combination of δ and . Even at
this level of details, it is possible to identify the most promising  values for
the transformations. In particular, let us consider the Flow per Link correla-
tion in Figure 5.18(a). As already observed for the cumulative distribution,
the correlation index decreases considerably when  is less than 0.3. Fixed a
minimum PCC threshold, we can start reasoning about the relation between
 and δ. Fixed a minimum value of 0.77 for PCC, we can reach a comparable
quality result even if we decrease  by increasing the value of δ. From the
figure we can infer that the data utility provided by  = 0.3 is equivalent
to the data utility for  = 0.2 and δ = 0.2. Similarly, fixed a value for ,
say  = 0.3, by increasing δ it is possible to increase the data quality of the
reconstructed flows. The relation between the two parameters enables the
data owner to define the most suitable trade-off between data protection and
data utility. The discussion for the choice of the correct  parameter is even
more crucial for the betweenness quality measures. Figures 5.18(e) & (f)
evince that the PCC drops when the threshold is below  = 0.3. However,
when δ is increased the quality measure performance raises.
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Figure 5.18: Distribution of the Pearson Correlation of the various network-
based measures after the privacy transformation
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Mobility Application. We also present the results obtained by these
approaches with regard to mobility applications. In particular, we show
that these analyses, that require the use of mobility data, can be done even
using the perturbed data from the UniversalNoise and the BalancedNoise
methods, which, as we have just shown, offer good guarantees on the utility.
Figures 5.19-5.22 show the reconstructed map for different parameters
for privacy preservation. In particular, in Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 we
display the results of the application of the UniversalNoise approach. As
one can see, comparing the original map (a) with the maps obtained after
the privacy transformation, we can observe that for  = 0.5 (b) we have
high quality results, but even with low values of , e.g.  = 0.3 (c) and
 = 0.2 (d), it is still possible to reason about traffic condition since the
major flows for links are sufficiently preserved. As we have already seen
Figure 5.19: Comparison of traffic analysis with UniversalNoise
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in different occasions, the Flow per Zone measure is more robust to data
transformation, since the randomization is performed on the edge level and,
hence, in the same zone different perturbations on incident edges tend to
compensate each others; this property is further confirmed by these images,
where the use of  = 0.2 allows to achieve a very good analysis.
Figure 5.20: Comparison of density analysis with UniversalNoise
From Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22 we can notice the influence of the
δ parameter on the transformed flows. In fact, fixed a value  = 0.2 (re-
ported in the figures at top-right position) the overall quality of the maps
can be improved by increasing the second parameter of the BalancedNoise
approach. In particular, it is evident how the resulting maps for δ = 0.1 (c)
and δ = 0.2 (d) present a topology similar to the original data.
Clustering Application. Besides, we present our results with regard
to the clustering analysis and Mobility Borders. Figure 5.23 shows a visual
comparison between the resulting aggregations for different combinations of
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Figure 5.21: Comparison of traffic analysis with BalancedNoise
 and δ and the aggregation resulting from the original data. The borders
yielding from the original data are rendered as thicker lines to facilitate the
comparison. The resulting borders for the transformed data are rendered
by colors: zones in the same group are filled with the same color. The
map shows the influence of the two parameters for the transformation, in
particular we show the resulting maps for  = 0.2 and δ = 0.2. We can
observe that the Mobility Borders results are very robust to data pertur-
bation, since the majority of the zones are preserved even for low values of
. However, it is possible to identify small variation on central zones of the
map with a higher density of links and connections. In general, the zones
grouped for the original data tend to stay in the same group also for the
transformed data. In some cases, it happens that an original group is split
across two or three distinct new groups. As explained in Section 5.3.2, to
analytically evaluate such behavior, we consider precision and recall. The
resulting values for the two measures are showed in Figure 5.24. We can
see that the precision (Figure 5.24(left)) remains very high for any value
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Figure 5.22: Comparison of density analysis with BalancedNoise
Figure 5.23: Mobility Borders results for  = 0.2 and 〈 = 0.2, δ = 0.2〉
compared with results from original data
of , i.e., zones in the same group in the transformed data are in the same
group also in the original one, for the motivations discussed above. Recall
(Figure 5.24(right)), instead, tends to decrease for  < 0.3, i.e., each zone
of a group is no longer labeled as belonging to it, but the overall result is
increased by augmenting δ to 0.2 or 0.3.
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Figure 5.24: Quantitative measure for Mobility Borders
Spatial Distribution of the errors. We also studied the impact of
the parameters of the privacy transformation in more detail by analyzing
the spatial distributions of the errors, expressed as the logarithms of the
ratios of the aggregated traffic values obtained from transformed data to
those obtained from the original data. The use of the logarithms allowed us
to reduce the impact of local outliers. The study was done using the results
of 99 runs for all combinations of the values of  from 0.1 to 0.9 with the
step 0.1 and the values of delta 0.01, 0.02, 0.025, 0.03, 0.05, and up to the
value 0.2 with the step 0.025. The corresponding 99 spatial distributions of
the errors were clustered by similarity using the k-means methods. We ex-
perimented with different k and found that, starting from k = 9, increasing
the value of k just subdivides small clusters into yet smaller ones, mostly
singletons. There is one large cluster (Cluster 7) consisting of 68 distribu-
tions that preserves when k increases. This cluster consists of the spatial
distributions with the best (i.e., lowest) values of the errors.
The area-wise median errors for this cluster are shown in the map in Figure
5.25 (left) by color-coding. Light yellow corresponds to values close to 0,
shades of orange and red represent overestimates and shades of blue un-
derestimates. The color legend is shown on the right of Figure 5.25. The
prevalence of light yellow and light shades of orange means that the absolute
values of the errors in cluster 7 are quite low. There are only a few high
overestimates occurring in areas with low traffic density. Cluster 7 includes
all spatial distributions for values of  = 0.4 and higher and values of delta
from 0.01 to 0.05 and almost all spatial distributions for epsilon 0.6 and
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higher irrespective of the value of δ. Hence, starting from  = 0.6, δ has no
impact on the data quality. For comparison, the map on the right of Fig-
ure 5.25 represents the errors in another cluster, which includes the spatial
situations for  = 0.2. Very high overestimates occur almost everywhere.
For  = 0.1, the overestimates are even higher. This study clarifies what
combinations of the parameter values should be used to obtain good results
in terms of utility of the transformed data.
Figure 5.25: Comparison of the spatial distributions of the errors for different
value combinations of  and δ.
5.4.4 Evaluation of Sketching Transformations
Up to this point, we focused our study only on one step of our general
approach described in Chapter 4, i.e., on the privacy-preserving transforma-
tion. Now, we want to investigate the fourth step, i.e., the sketching of the
frequency vectors (Section 4.2.4). We tried to apply three types of sketches:
AGMS (Section 2.2.1), Count-Min (Section 2.2.2) and Count (Section 2.2.3)
sketches. Each kind of sketch was run with different combinations of pa-
rameters α and γ, i.e., different sizes. For the generation of hash functions,
required by the different methods, we have relied on the implementation of
Rusu and Dobra, available at [77].
We analyzed again the Pearson correlation, and we report in Figure 5.26 the
values obtained for all network-based measures, starting by the use of the
UniversalNoise approach with  = 0.5. Each cluster represents the size of
the sketches (in Table 5.3-5.5 we show the exact parameters used) and each
bar represents the kind of sketch (red means no sketch, i.e., the correlation
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between the differentially private global frequency vector and the original
one). We stress that, in our experiments, the frequency vectors have about
15,900 elements. We investigate the results, for each kind of sketch, in the
following.
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Figure 5.26: Comparison of correlation of network-based measures after the
sketching transformation
AGMS sketch. Among the sketches that we considered, AGMS sketches
are the most simple sketches, but they are the slowest (we recall they require
linear time on the sketch size) and the ones that give worse results. As one
can see, the correlation values are very low for all the measures except for
the Flow per Link and for the Edge Betweenness. However, other measures
strictly related to these two (respectively, Flow per Zone and Node Between-
ness) are extremely different, therefore we can argue that these correlations
are not very indicative. This fact is confirmed by the scatter plot reported
in Figure 5.27 (a), where we can see that the values are completely not cor-
related.
We believe that AGMS sketches are not suitable to reduce communication
while maintaining good data quality, at least in our particular setting. We
must consider, however, that they have been designed for different goals,
such as the estimate of the sum of the squares of the frequencies rather than
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for the estimation of the single frequencies. Only in recent years they have
been used for this aim.
α γ size
AGMS3k 0.03162 0.05 3,000
AGMS5k 0.03162 0.01 5,000
AGMS10k 0.03162 0.00005 10,000
Table 5.3: AGMS sketch size for different values of α and γ.
Count-Min sketch. The Count-Min sketches provide amazing results
with regard to the correlations: PCC values of all measures are very close
to 1. However, by further investigating, we realized that these results are
only apparent: in Figure 5.27 (b) we show an example to explain the reason
of these correlations. The estimated values are very compact around the
regression line, but the latter is quite far away from optimal values, thus
we can say that some kind of correlation with the original values exists,
but there is an overestimation of the flows. The reason for this behavior is
that Count-Min requires only positive values as input, so each vehicle must
perform a preprocessing phase in which it sets to 0 all the negative values
obtained at the end of the privacy-preserving step. Hence, a lot of values
are flattened upwards and there is no longer any compensation between
positive and negative values. Indeed, we have seen that when there is not
the problem of managing negative values (as in the case of BoundedNoise)
the Count-Min is the method that performs better.
α γ Columns (w) Rows (d) w × d
CM3k 0.002 0.05 1,000 3 3,000
CM5k 0.0008 0.01 2,500 2 5,000
CM10k 0.0008 0.02 2,500 4 10,000
Table 5.4: Count-Min sketch size for different values of α and γ.
Count sketch. We can see how the Count sketch transformation pre-
serve the PCC for the two measures Flow per Link and Flow per Zone. The
former measures are well preserved since the sketch framework has been
proposed for the compression of large arrays like those considered in this
application. To the same extent, the second measure is well preserved when
higher compression rates are reached. In Figure 5.27 we show that the val-
81
Evaluation on Real Big Data
ues of Flow per Link are not so sparse, and there is no strange behavior.
Moreover, this scatter plot is very similar to the one obtained by comparing
the differential private and the original values, so this means that the data
compression introduced a small approximation with respect to the private
data. It is interesting to note how the topological properties of the graph,
like Clustering Coefficient and Node Degree, are ruined after the compres-
sion. The measures of betweenness are well preserved even if they suffer for
high rates of compression. In conclusion, we can state these sketches give
good results and they can be used while preserving the utility.
α γ Columns (w) Rows (d) w × d
C3k 0.03162 0.05 1,000 3 3,000
C5k 0.03162 0.01 1,000 5 5,000
C10k 0.03162 0.00005 1,000 10 10,000
Table 5.5: Count sketch size for different values of α and γ.
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Figure 5.27: Correlation of Flow per Link after the sketching transformation
by varying the kind of sketch
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The issue of protecting privacy while releasing personal data is scientifically
interesting and has been thoroughly studied particularly in the context of
relational data. Unfortunately, only a few studies have addressed this issue
in the context complex and big data, like spatio-temporal data, even if, as
of today, we have an ever-growing diffusion of this kind of data. This new
form of data are semantically rich and this makes difficult to find an effi-
cient privacy transformation; moreover often traditional privacy-preserving
techniques for relational databases are inadequate.
In this thesis we have studied the problem of protecting individual pri-
vacy in a distributed system where the goal is analyzing movement data. The
data distribution makes the problem of the privacy protection more challeng-
ing. We have proposed the application of the privacy-by-design paradigm in
the design and developing of three privacy transformation methods. They
are based on the well-known (but seldom used for mobility data) notion of
differential privacy that provides very effective data protection guarantees.
Each solution is characterized by a different trade-off between privacy and
data utility. In particular in our framework each vehicle, before sending the
information about its movements within a time interval, applies a transfor-
mation to the data to achieve privacy and then it can create a summarization
of the private data (by using a sketching algorithm) to reduce the amount
of information to be transmitted.
This thesis presents two main contributions: (a) a framework that allows
making available mobility data, while guaranteeing individual privacy for the
people which the data refer to, through the application of one of the three
possible methods, each one with a different guarantee; and (b) a framework
that allows evaluating the proposed algorithms from the point of view of
achievable utility after the privacy-preserving process. The goal reached by
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our framework is double: on one hand, it allows us to provide a good level
of privacy-protection; on the other hand, it allows to maintain a reasonable
quality of the data, so that private data could be used for further analyses.
Specifically, it gives us the opportunity to obtain private data that preserve
peculiar features, as to guarantee a good quality of the analyses which can
be performed on these data. For this purpose, the evaluation framework
we have proposed presents: (1) functions that enable to verify if any basic
statistics of the data are preserved; (2) quantitative measures that enable
to verify the quality of private data; and (3) examples of analyses that can
be performed on private data, compared to the ones carried out directly on
the original data.
We have validated the robustness and efficiency of our privacy-preserving
data aggregation methods by extensive experiments on large, real GPS data
and our finding is that the proposed privacy-preserving techniques could
achieve good results in terms of utility, preserving some meaningful proper-
ties of original data and keeping them usable for many analyses and appli-
cations.
Clearly, the proposed privacy-preserving framework is only one of the
possible ways to address the issue we studied. As an example, different
variants on the computation of the sensitivity in differential privacy are
worth considering, to protect privacy on a different level. Additionally,
future investigations could be directed to explore other methods to achieve
differential privacy; as an example, it would be interesting to understand
the impact of the use of the geometric mechanism instead of the Laplace
one to achieve differential privacy.
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